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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effects of macroprudential policies on bank risk through a large 
panel of banks operating in 61 advanced and emerging market economies. There are three 
main findings. First, there is evidence suggesting that macroprudential tools have a significant 
impact on bank risk. Second, the responses to changes in macroprudential tools differ among 
banks, depending on their specific balance sheet characteristics. In particular, banks that are 
small, weakly capitalised and with a higher share of wholesale funding react more strongly to 
changes in macroprudential tools. Third, controlling for bank-specific characteristics, 
macroprudential policies are more effective in a tightening than in an easing episode. 
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Prior to the global financial crisis (GFC) financial stability was mainly considered from a 
microprudential perspective. The aim of supervisory policy was to reduce the risk that 
individual institutions would fail, without any explicit regard for their impact on the financial 
system as a whole or on the overall economy. Lehman Brothers’ default reminded us that 
financial stability has a macroprudential or systemic dimension that cannot be ignored. 
Treating the financial system as merely the sum of its parts leads one to overlook the system’s 
historical tendency to swing from boom to bust. Nowadays, financial stability is considered 
from a macroprudential perspective. 
However, the implementation of a new macroprudential framework for financial stability 
raises a number of challenges. A first challenge is the evaluation of the effectiveness of 
macroprudential policies, especially when more than one tool is activated. Moreover, 
effectiveness should be analysed with respect to the specific goal that macroprudential 
policies are designed to achieve; that is, to increase the resilience of the financial system, or, 
more ambitiously, to tame financial booms and busts. At the moment, the evidence is mixed 
and most research focuses on analysing the impact of macroprudential tools on bank lending 
(as an intermediate target), not directly on bank risk (the limitation of which is the ultimate 
goal). For instance, recent evidence suggests that debt-to-income ratios and, probably to a 
lesser extent, loan-to-value ratios are comparatively more effective than capital requirements 
as tools for containing credit growth (Claessens et al, 2014). Indeed, the recent activation of 
the Basel III countercyclical capital buffer to risk-weighted domestic residential mortgages in 
Switzerland, though having had some effect on mortgage pricing, seems to have had little 
impact on credit extension (Basten and Koch, 2015). But the main goal of the Basel III buffers 
is to increase the resilience of the banking system, not to smooth the credit cycle. Restraining 
the boom is perhaps no more than a welcome, potential side effect (Drehmann and 
Gambacorta, 2012).  
A second challenge pertains to the varied nature of macroprudential objectives and 
instruments. In this area, there is no one-size-fits-all approach. Which tools to use, how to 
calibrate them and when to deploy them will all depend on how the authorities view the 
vulnerabilities involved and how confident they are in their analysis. The legal and institutional 
setup will also be relevant. A given instrument’s effects depend on a variety of factors, which 
have to be assessed against the chosen objective. Some instruments may work better to 
achieve the narrow aim of increasing financial system resilience rather than the broader aim 
of constraining the cycle. For instance, countercyclical capital buffers aim to build cushions 
against banks’ total credit exposures, whereas loan-to-value ratio caps only affect new 
borrowers (and usually only those that are highly leveraged). This argues in favour of capital 
buffers if the objective is to improve overall resilience. However, loan-to-value ratios may be 
more effective if the aim is to curb specific types of credit extension.  
Third, most macroprudential policies aim at containing systemic risk, a type of risk that is 
by nature endogenous. By using macroprudential tools, policymakers aim at limiting bank 
risk-taking and the probability of the occurrence of a financial crisis. This means that – ideally 
– we should also be interested in how these policies influence a bank’s contribution to system-
wide risk. Measurement of systemic risk is, however, still rudimentary, although some 
concepts have been developed (measures such as CoVaR, stress testing and Shapley values). 
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A first step could be to evaluate how macroprudential tools impact specific measures of bank 
risk, such as the expected default frequency (EDF) or the Z-score. The calculation of the EDF 
indicator requires bank issuance of equity on the stock market, while the Z-score is an 
indicator of the probability of default which relies on balance sheet variables.  
This paper complements other studies on the effectiveness of macroprudential policies.1 
Its main contribution is to analyses the effectiveness of such policies on bank risk in a 
comprehensive way, exploiting the cross-sectional dimension among countries. Interestingly, 
the more advanced economies tended to ignore the macroprudential dimension in the run-
up to the crisis. Emerging market economies (EMEs) were generally better aware of the need 
to think about the financial system as a whole, and more willing to intervene in response to 
evidence of a build-up of imbalances and risks (Figure 1). All this means that it is necessary to 
pool information for a large number of banks operating in both advanced countries and EMEs, 
and to control for different institutional setups and time-specific factors affecting the risk-
taking channel. In other words, pooling information regarding countries with different 
experiences in the use of macroprudential tools greatly reduces concerns about possible 
omitted variables (Demirguc-Kunt et al, 2013).  
Using information for 3,177 banks operating in both advanced economies and EMEs over 
the period 1990–2012, we find that macroprudential tools – both those focusing on 
dampening the cycle (ie loan to value ratios, reserve and currency requirements) and those 
specifically designed to enhance banks’ resilience (ie capital requirements) – have a significant 
impact on bank risk. We also find that the responses to changes in macroprudential tools 
differ among banks, depending on their specific balance sheet characteristics. In particular, 
banks that are small, weakly capitalised and with a higher share of wholesale funding react 
more strongly to changes in macroprudential tools. Finally, macroprudential policies are more 
effective in a tightening than an easing cycle. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses how 
macroprudential policies can impact bank risk. Section III describes the identification strategy 
and data used in our analysis, while Section IV and V present the main results and robustness 
checks. The last section summarises our main conclusions. 
2. Macroprudential policy and bank risk 
Following a widely accepted definition, “macroprudential policies are designed to identify and 
mitigate risks to systemic stability, in turn reducing the cost to the economy from a disruption 
in financial services that underpin the workings of financial markets - such as the provision of 
credit, but also of insurance and payment and settlement services” (FSB/IMF/BIS, 2009). 
However, providing a framework for the relationship between macroprudential policies and 
systemic risk is not straightforward. The need for macroprudential policies arises from two 
dimensions of systemic risk: the time and cross-sectional dimensions.  
The time dimension represents the need to constrain financial booms (Borio, 2014). Such 
financial booms can originate from both the supply and demand sides of agents, and financial 
 
1  For an overview of the existing empirical evidence on the effectiveness of macroprudential policies see, amongst others, 
Claessens (2014).  
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intermediary behaviour. For example, the amplification mechanism known as “financial 
accelerator” is mainly related to the demand side (Claessens et al, 2014). But other 
mechanisms are related to the supply side, as in the model of Adrian and Shin (2010, 2014), 
where an initial positive shock that boosts the value of a bank’s assets, such as loans and 
securities, could induce a further increase in debt if the bank targets a certain leverage ratio. 
Banks’ decisions on leverage and the composition of assets and/or liabilities could make them 
more vulnerable to future negative shocks through balance sheet mismatches.  
The second feature of systemic risk is its cross-sectional dimension, which is mainly 
related to the interconnectedness of financial institutions. This aspect became the focus of 
policy discussion after the GFC as specific shocks to some institutions were heavily amplified 
by spreading across financial markets and countries. The new Basel III regulatory framework, 
for instance, which targets systemically important financial institutions (SIFI) with specific 
capital surcharges, aims to reduce negative externalities stemming from interconnectedness.  
The risk-taking behaviour of banks, thus, could be mitigated by the active use of 
macroprudential policies. For instance, capital-based instruments, such as capital 
conservation buffers, would allow institutions to accumulate capital in good times, which 
could then be used to absorb losses in stress periods. Similarly, the countercyclical capital 
buffer could be actively used to “achieve the broader macro-prudential goal of protecting the 
banking sector from periods of excess credit growth.” (BCBS, 2010, pp 5). In addition, 
provisioning requirements, such as the dynamic provisioning tool used in Spain, also require 
banks to adjust the total amount of loss provisions when their profits are growing, with the 
aim of being able to draw on these provisions during an economic downturn. Therefore, the 
collective use of capital-based requirements could mitigate bank risk by requiring higher 
buffers during an upturn. Bank risk could be further mitigated by the use of other 
macroprudential tools during an upturn. For instance, increasing liquidity requirements and 
imposing stringent currency instruments could minimise bank risk emanating from repricing 
and liquidity gaps, as well as exchange rate fluctuations. Therefore, single or multiple uses of 
macroprudential instruments are expected to have an impact on the EDF or Z-score of banks, 
two alternative measures or bank risk used in this study. 
Besides the direct effect of macroprudential tools on bank risk, monetary policy also has 
an impact on risk-taking and financial stability (Gambacorta, 2009; Borio and Zhu, 2014; 
Altunbas et al, 2014; Dell’Ariccia et al, 2010). A prolonged period of low interest rates could 
impact risk-taking in two different ways. The first is through the search for yield (Rajan, 2005). 
Low interest rates may increase incentives for asset managers to take on more risks for 
contractual, behavioural or institutional reasons. For example, in 2003–2004, many investors 
shifted from low-risk government bonds to higher-yielding but also to riskier corporate and 
EME bonds. A similar mechanism was detected in the theoretical model designed by 
Dell’Ariccia et al (2010): monetary easing leads to a reduction in the interest rate on bank 
loans, which, in turn, reduces a bank’s gross return, conditional on its portfolio. This reduces 
the bank’s incentive to monitor its loans, and the real yield on safe (monitored) assets, thus 
banks will typically increase their demand for risky assets. 
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The second way in which low interest rates could encourage banks to take on more risk 
is through their impact on valuations, incomes and cash flows.2 A reduction in the policy rate 
boosts asset and collateral values, which in turn can modify bank estimates of probabilities of 
default, losses given default and volatilities. For example, by increasing asset prices, low 
interest rates tend to reduce volatility and thus risk perceptions: since a higher stock price 
increases the value of equity relative to corporate debt, a sharp increase in stock prices 
reduces corporate leverage and could thus decrease the risk of holding stocks.3 This example 
can be applied to the widespread use of Value-at-Risk methodologies for economic and 
regulatory capital purposes (Danielsson et al, 2004). As volatility tends to decline in rising 
markets, it releases the risk budgets of financial firms and encourages position-taking. A 
similar argument is made in the model of Adrian and Shin (2009), who stress that changes in 
measured risk determine adjustments in bank balance sheets and leverage conditions, and, 
in turn, amplify business cycle movements.4  
Macroprudential tools could, in principle, be used to moderate the risk-taking incentives 
arising from monetary policy decisions. For instance, Igan and Kang (2011) argue that the 
impact of a tightening of monetary policy on defaults can be contained by having in place 
conservative limits on debt-to-income (DTI) ratios. On the other hand, macroprudential 
measures, such as limits on LTV ratios, can reduce vulnerabilities under the condition that 
accommodative monetary policy is driving up asset prices. Additionally, higher capital 
requirements (including countercyclical) or tighter leverage and liquidity ratios may help 
contain increases in bank risks in response to expected lax monetary policy (see Farhi and 
Tirole, 2012; IMF, 2013). To complement the theoretical discussions outlined above and 
individual country studies, the analysis in this paper controls for monetary policy conditions 
and a broader set of country- and bank-specific characteristics. 
3. Model, identification strategy and data 
The baseline empirical model is given by the following equation, adapted from Altunbas et 
al (2014): 
 , , , , 1 , ,
, , , 1 , , ,
_
                 C
i k t i k t k t k t
k t i k t i k t i k t
Risk Risk EDF NF MP
M BSC
α β γ
ψ λ θ κ ε
−
−
∆ = ∆ + ∆ + +
+ + + + +
  (1) 
 
2  This is close in spirit to the familiar financial accelerator, in which increases in collateral values reduce borrowing constraints 
(Bernanke et al, 1996). Adrian and Shin (2009) claim that the risk-taking channel differs from and strengthens the financial 
accelerator because it focuses on amplification mechanisms created by financing frictions in the lending sector. See also 
Borio and Zhu (2014).  
3  For this reason, the link between asset prices and asset price volatility is sometimes described as the leverage effect. See, 
amongst others, Pagan and Schwert (1990) and the studies cited in Bollerslev et al (1992). 
4  Risk-taking may also be influenced by the communication policies of a central bank and the characteristics of policymakers’ 
reaction functions. For example, a high degree of central bank predictability with regard to future policy decisions can 
reduce market uncertainty and thus lead banks to take on more risks. Moreover, agents’ perception that the central bank 
will ease monetary policy in the event of adverse economic outcomes could lower the probability of large downside risks, 
thereby producing an insurance effect. For this reason, Diamond and Rajan (2012) argue that, in order to diminish banks’ 
incentive to take on liquidity risk, monetary policy should be kept tighter in good times than strictly necessary based on 
current economic conditions,. 
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with i=1,…, N , k= 1, …,K and  t=1, …, T, where i is the bank, k is the country and t is time. Table 
1 reports the summary statistics for the variables used and the relevant sources. The final 
database includes 3,177 banks headquartered in 61 countries.5 More information at the 
country level is provided in Annex A. 
In the baseline equation (1), the annual change of the risk measure (∆Risk) for bank i, 
headquartered in country k, in year t, is regressed on its own lag and EDF change for the non-
financial sector in country k (∆EDF_NF). This variable aims at filtering out the effects of 
changes in the market price of risk due to the business cycle. MP indicates the change in the 
macroprudential tool, which could be the change in an aggregate index, as in Cerutti et al 
(2016), or a complete vector of macroprudential tools. BSC and MC represent, respectively, 
additional bank-specific characteristics and macro variables that are introduced to 
disentangle the risk-taking channel from other mechanisms at work. In particular, the vector 
MC includes a measure for the monetary policy stance (DIFF, the difference between the real 
interest rate and the natural rate) and the growth rate of nominal GDP (∆GDP).6 We also 
include time invariant bank fixed effects ( iθ ) and a dummy variable ( ,k tκ ) that takes the value 
of 1 in those specific years in which countries experienced a banking crisis and zero elsewhere 
(Valencia and Laeven, 2012). 
3.1 Measurement of bank risk 
By setting macroprudential tools, policymakers aim to limit bank risk-taking and the 
probability of the occurrence of a financial crisis. This means that – ideally – we should 
measure how macroprudential policies influence a bank’s contribution to system-wide risk. 
Measurement of systemic risk is, however, still rudimentary, although some concepts have 
been developed (CoVaR, stress testing and Shapley value measures). A compromise could be 
to evaluate how macroprudential tools impact specific measures of bank risk. 
In the baseline model, the dependent variable is given by the change in the EDF (∆EDF), 
representing the probability that a bank will default within a given time horizon (typically one 
year). EDF is a well-known, forward-looking indicator of risk, computed by Moody’s KMV, 
which builds on Merton’s model to price corporate bond debt (Merton, 1974). The EDF value, 
expressed as a percentage, is calculated by combining banks’ financial statements with stock 
market information and Moody’s proprietary default database. We also checked the 
robustness of the results by using change in the Z-score as an alternative measure of bank 
risk. 7 We mitigate the effects of outliers by dropping the first and the last percentile of the 
 
5  We control for mergers and acquisitions in the following way. If a bank A and a bank B are merged in a bank C, we consider 
bank A and bank B as different financial intermediaries until the date of the merger and then we include a new bank C. In 
case a bank D acquires a bank E, we include Bank E in the database until the date of the acquisition, and we drop the year-
observation for bank E in which the acquisition took place. After excluding the presence of outliers, excluding information 
in the first and last percentile of the distribution, 20,870 observations and 3,177 banks remained. 
6  Similar results (not reported) are obtained by including in the specification both the growth rate of real GDP and the 
inflation rate.  
7  The Z-score can be summarised as Z=(k+ROA)/σROA, where k is equity capital as percent of assets, ROA is the average after-
tax return as a percent of assets, and σROA is the standard deviation of the after-tax return on assets, as a proxy for return 
volatility. The Z-score measures the number of standard deviations a return realisation has to fall in order to deplete equity, 
under the assumption of normality of bank returns. A higher Z-score corresponds to a lower upper bound of insolvency 
risk. A higher z-score implies therefore a lower probability of insolvency risk. For an application, see amongst others, Laeven 
and Levine (2009). 
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distribution of the variables. Figure 2 shows that the cross-sectional dispersion of banks’ EDFs 
and Z-scores (both measured by means of the coefficient of variation) is not concentrated in 
the period of the GFC. This means that there were already significant differences in bank risk 
at the cross-sectional level prior to the crisis. Interestingly the cross-sectional dispersion of 
the Z-score is also very high in relation to the early 1990s’ recession and associated banking 
crisis. 
In Table 2, banks are grouped depending on their specific risk position, using one-year 
EDF values. For the bank-specific characteristics, we use bank-level data from BankScope, a 
commercial database maintained by Fitch and Bureau van Dijk. A ”high-risk” bank has the 
average EDF of banks included in the tenth decile (ie in the 10% of the riskier banks with an 
average EDFH equal to 7.4%); a ”low-risk” bank has the average EDF of the banks in the first 
decile (EDFL is equal to 0.07%). The first part of the table shows that high-risk banks are less 
strongly capitalised. The lower level of capitalisation appears to be consistent with the higher 
perceived risk of these banks. Additionally, low-risk banks make relatively more loans than 
high-risk banks, and are more efficient (have a lower cost-to-income ratio). 
Bank profitability, measured by Return on Assets (ROA), is higher and more stable for low-
risk banks. This result is probably due to the inclusion of the GFC period in the sample. The 
coefficient of variation of the ROA, calculated using information for the four quarters ahead, 
for low-risk bank is indeed half (one quarter) with respect to high-risk banks, considering the 
EDF (Z-score) as a measure of risk. 
It is worth noting that banks with a lower Z-score are more risky, while banks with a lower 
EDF are less risky. To compare the signs of the coefficients in the regressions, we therefore 
multiply the Z-score by -1. Using this approach, a higher level of the two indicators (Z-score 
and EDF) is always associated with more risky banks.  
3.2 Macroprudential policy indicators 
The construction of macroprudential policy indicators involves a number of steps. First, we 
consider an aggregate index that allows us to evaluate the overall effectiveness of 
macroprudential tools when more than one measure is activated. This aggregate index 
represents a very rough approximation because macroprudential tools may be very different 
in nature. For example, we may need to consider a case where the minimum loan to value 
ratio was increased while, contemporaneously, reserve ratios were reduced. To deal with this 
kind of situation, we first consider a dummy that takes the value of +1 if a given 
macroprudential tool was tightened and -1 if it was eased, leaving zero elsewhere. Then, 
following Kuttner and Shim (2013), we calculate an aggregate macroprudential indicator 
(MP_indexk,t) that sums up all the different dummies for the various macroprudential tools. 
This means that, if multiple actions in the same direction are taken within a given year, the 
variable could take on the values of 2 or –2, or even 3 and –3. It also means that a tightening 
action and a loosening action taken within the same year could cancel each other out. This 
indicator weights each tool in the same way and will be considered in our baseline regression. 
Second, we recognise that the macroprudential toolkit tends to be large, as it combines 
an array of different instruments. In particular, we distinguish them according to the following 
five categories: a) capital-based instruments; b) liquidity-based instruments; c) asset-side 
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instruments; d) reserve requirements; and e) currency requirements. Table 3 provides an 
overview of these categories (with further information in Annex B). 
Third, the purpose of the various policies could differ. For instance, some instruments are 
intended to increase directly the financial sector’s resilience, while others focus on dampening 
the cycle as an intermediate target. In that respect, the effects of specific macroprudential 
tools on credit growth and bank risk can be different. Claessens et al (2014) distinguish 
between the goals and the types of policy that are commonly used. Macroprudential tools 
with the main objective of enhancing the financial sector’s resilience include countercyclical 
capital requirements, leverage restrictions, general or dynamic provisioning, and the 
establishment of liquidity requirements, among others. Within the category of 
macroprudential tools aimed at dampening the credit cycle, Claessens et al (2014) include 
changes in reserve requirements, variations in limits on foreign currency mismatches, cyclical 
adjustments to loan-loss provisioning, and margins or haircuts. Other macroprudential policy 
aims include reducing the effects of contagion or shock propagation from SIFIs or networks. 
This group might also include policies, such as capital surcharges linked to systemic risk, 
restrictions on asset composition or activities.  
Using the categorisation presented in Claessens et al (2014), we classify policies according 
to their purpose. In particular, policies to dampen the cycle – ie those used by authorities 
countercyclically to dampen an expected credit boom or credit crunch – are identified with 
by term cyclical (we refer to the categories (c), (d) and (e) in Table 3). Macroprudential tools 
with a more structural objective, which are intended to increase the resilience of the financial 
sector (such as capital, liquidity or provisioning requirements), are identified with by the term 
resilience (categories (a) and (b) in Table 3). 
The chart pie on the left-hand side of Figure 3 splits the different types of macroprudential 
policy adopted in the period 1990–2014. Interestingly, only one quarter of policies are aimed 
at improving the resilience of the financial sector using capital, liquidity of provisioning 
requirements (slices in blue colour). By contrast, the vast majority have the purpose of 
dampening the cycle – ie those used by the authorities countercyclically to dampen an 
expected credit boom or credit crunch. More than half are represented by changes in reserve 
requirements.  
Finally, we split the changes in macroprudential tools into easing and tightening cases. In 
this way, we can verify the asymmetric effects of each tool. The chart pie on the right-hand 
side of Figure 3 shows that in three quarters of cases macroprudential tools were tightened. 
The dummy MP_easing (MP_tightening) takes a value of 1 if the macroprudential tool was 
eased (tightened) in a given year and zero elsewhere. This specification is particularly 
important to check our results against the existing literature. Cerutti et al (2016), for example, 
find some evidence of the asymmetric impact of macroprudential policies, claiming that those 
policies seem more effective when credit growth rates are very high, but have a less positive 
impact during busts. Similarly, Claessens et al (2014) find that macroprudential policies help 
mitigate asset growth, with the effects largely present during the boom (implying that the 
tightening measures are more effective). Finally, Kuttner and Shim (2013) find that three of 
the four macroprudential policies analysed in their study have statistically significant effects 
on housing credit when measures are tightened but not loosened. However, they find similar 
but weaker asymmetric responses when they assess the impact of macroprudential policies 
on house prices. 
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3.3 Bank-specific characteristics   
In order to discriminate between loan supply and demand movements, the bank lending 
channel literature has focused on cross-sectional differences across banks. This strategy relies 
on the hypothesis that certain bank-specific characteristics (for example, bank size, liquidity, 
capitalisation and funding composition) only influence loan supply while a bank’s loan 
demand is largely independent of these factors. Broadly speaking, this approach assumes 
that, after a monetary tightening, the drop in the total availability of funding, which affects 
banks’ ability to make new loans or their ability to shield their loan portfolios, differs among 
banks.  
Drawing on this literature, we analyse macroprudential tools in the same way as monetary 
policy changes. Using the BankScope database, we therefore include four bank-specific 
characteristics that could influence bank supply shifts in the case of macroprudential policy 
changes. The first three are: bank size, proxied by the logarithm of a bank’s total assets (SIZE), 
the liquidity ratio (LIQ) and the capital to asset ratio (CAP). These give insightful information, 
not only on banks’ ability to insulate loan supply from monetary and macroprudential shocks 
(Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Gambacorta, 2005) but also control for 
“too big to fail” considerations, differences in business models and capital regulation effects. 
The fourth indicator is the share of deposits over total liabilities (DEP), a measure of a bank’s 
contractual strength. Banks with a large amount of deposits will adjust their deposit rates by 
less (and less quickly) than banks whose liabilities are mainly composed of variable rate bonds 
that are directly affected by market movements (Berlin and Mester, 1999). Intuitively, this 
should mean that, in view of the presence of menu costs, it is more likely that a bank will 
adjust its terms for passive deposits if the conditions relating to its own alternative form of 
refinancing (ie bonds) change. Moreover, a bank will refrain from changing deposit conditions 
because, if the ratio of deposits to total liabilities is high, even small changes to their price will 
have a substantial effect on total interest rate costs. By contrast, banks that use relatively more 
bonds than deposits for financing purposes come under greater pressure because their costs 
increase contemporaneously with market rates (and to a similar extent). Finally, the ratio of 
bank deposits over total liabilities is also influenced by the existence of deposit insurance, 
which makes this form of funding more stable and less exposed to the risk of a run. Acharya 
and Mora (2015) report that banks may actively manage the deposit to total funding ratio by 
changing deposit rates. 
To draw a parallel with the bank lending channel literature, it is interesting to investigate 
whether the responses to macroprudential shocks differ by type of bank. To test for this, we 
introduce interactions terms that are the products of a macroprudential indicator and bank-
specific characteristics ( 1,,, * −tkitk BSCMP ):  
 , , , , 1 , , , , , 1
, , , 1 , , ,
_  C
                 *
i k t i k t k t k t k t i k t
k t i k t i k t i k t
Risk Risk EDF NF MP M BSC
MP BSC
α β γ ψ λ
δ θ κ ε
− −
−
∆ = ∆ + ∆ + + + +
+ + + +
 (2) 
Similarly, with the approach used by the bank lending channel literature, the relevant test is 
on the significance ofδ . Broadly speaking, this approach assumes that after a monetary 
tightening episode (macroprudential tightening in our case), the ability to shield loan 
portfolios is different across banks. In particular, small and less strongly capitalised banks, 
which suffer from a high degree of informational frictions in financial markets, face a higher 
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cost in raising non-secured deposits and are forced to reduce their lending by more than 
other banks; illiquid banks have fewer options for shielding themselves from the effect of a 
prudential policy tightening on lending simply by drawing down cash and securities. 
Therefore, this literature does not analyse the macroeconomic impact of the “bank lending 
channel” on loans but asserts the existence of such a channel, based on the fact that different 
responses of lending supply among banks are detected. All bank-specific characteristics have 
been “demeaned” so that the coefficients λ   and δ  can be considered to be the effects on 
the average bank.  
3.4 Endogeneity issues 
One possible limitation of the suggested empirical strategy is that, in principle, the situation 
of the banking sector could also have an impact on macroprudential policy decisions. In order 
to mitigate endogeneity problems, we use the dynamic Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) panel methodology to obtain consistent estimates of the relationship between 
macroprudential policy and bank risk. This methodology was first described by Holtz-Eakin et 
al (1988), and Arellano and Bond (1991), and further developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). 
The use of this methodology reduces any endogeneity bias that may affect the estimation of 
the regression parameters. It also takes into account the heterogeneity of the data caused by 
unobservable factors affecting individual banks.   
We use the instruments as defined by Blundell and Bond (1998). According to these 
authors, the exogenous variables, transformed in first differences, are instrumented by 
themselves, while the endogenous regressors (also transformed in first differences) are 
instrumented by their lags in levels.8 As a final precaution, we consider all bank-specific 
characteristics at t-1.  
4. Results 
The main results are reported in Tables 4 to 7. The S-GMM estimator ensures efficiency and 
consistency, provided that the residuals are not subject to serial correlation of order two 
(AR(2) test), and that the instruments used are valid (Hansen test). Neither test (as reported at 
the bottom of each table) should fail to reject the null hypothesis.9 
Table 4 presents the baseline regression results of specifications (1) and (2) using the 
MP_index. The table is split into two parts: the first two columns use the EDF as dependent 
 
8  This approach has been applied to other areas of research in which the model was affected by possible endogeneity biases. 
For instance, Blundell and Bond (1998) use it to estimate a labour demand model while Beck et al (2000) apply it to 
investigate the relation between financial development and economic growth. 
9  The consistency of the S-GMM estimator depends on the validity of the assumption that the error terms do not exhibit 
serial correlation and on the validity of the instruments. To address these issues, we use two specification tests suggested 
by Arellano and Bond (1991), and Blundell and Bond (1998). The first is a Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, which 
tests the overall validity of the instruments by analysing the sample analogue of the moment conditions used in the 
estimation process. The second test examines the hypothesis that the error term iktε  is not serially correlated. We test 
whether the differenced error term is second-order serially correlated (by construction, the differenced error term is 
probably first-order serially correlated even if the original error term is not). Failure to reject the null hypotheses of both 
tests should give support to our models.  
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variable, while the last two columns use the Z-score. To make results comparable, we multiply 
the Z-score by -1. In this way larger values of both the EDF and Z-score indicate higher risk.  
The coefficients on the MP_index are negative and significant, indicating that a tightening 
(easing) of macroprudential policies reduces (increases) bank risk. All coefficients for bank-
specific indicators are highly significant for the EDF and Z-score in our baseline model.  
The interaction terms between the MP_index and bank specific characteristics in column 
(2) and (4) indicate that the impact of macroprudential policies on bank risk is stronger for 
banks that are weakly capitalised, smaller, with low liquidity buffers and with a higher 
incidence of wholesale funding (fewer deposits). These results are in line with Gambacorta 
and Shin (2016): well capitalised banks are considered as less risky by the market and pay less 
– other things being equal – on their debt funding. Moreover, banks with a large proportion 
of deposits are considered safer because of the presence of deposit insurance.  
Figure 4 summarises the effects of macroprudential tools for banks with different levels 
of capital. The estimates roughly imply that a tightening of macroprudential tools leads to a 
decline in the expected default probability of around 0.7 percent for the average bank. The 
effect is higher for weakly capitalised banks (−0.9 percent) than for strongly capitalised ones 
(−0.4 percent), which have better access to markets for non-reservable liabilities. It is worth 
remembering that testing the null hypothesis that macroprudential policies effects are equal 
among banks with different capital ratios is identical to testing for the significance of the 
interaction between capital and the macroprudential policy indicator (see the coefficient on 
MP_indext*CAP t-1 in the second column of Table 4). Similar results are detected considering 
the Z-score as indicator of bank risk (see Figure 4 and the fourth column of Table 4). 
The analysis of the other control variables also provides interesting insights. The positive 
value of the lagged dependent variable indicates persistence in the adjustment process of 
risk. Changes in the EDF of the non-financial sector are positively linked to banks’ EDF and Z-
scores. This implies that the risks affecting financial firms are driven by broad movements in 
risk that are related to the overall behaviour of the economy (captured by non-financial sector 
risk). As indicated by the risk-taking channel, the monetary policy indicator (the difference 
between the real interest rate and the natural rate) is negatively correlated with bank risk. This 
means that a less restrictive monetary policy is associated with a higher level of bank risk. The 
state of the business cycle (growth rate of nominal GDP) is also negatively correlated with 
changes in bank risk-taking. However this effect is statistically significant only when the Z-
score is used as a risk–taking measure.  
Table 5 presents the results of model (2) where the MP_index is divided in two separate 
indices, one for macroprudential tools aimed at dampening the credit cycle (MP_cyclical index 
for categories (c), (d) and (e) in Table 3) and another one for macroprudential tools whose 
main objective is to enhance the financial sector’s resilience (MP_resilience index for categories 
(a) and (b) in Table 3). 
We also find in this case the expected negative sign on the two macroprudential indices: 
a tightening (easing) of macroprudential policies reduces (increases) risk for the average bank 
(remember that all bank-specific characteristics are demeaned). The interaction of the two 
macroprudential indices with bank-specific characteristics confirms that the impact of 
macroprudential policies on bank risk is stronger for banks that are weakly capitalised, smaller, 
with low liquidity buffers and with a higher incidence of wholesale funding. Interestingly, the 
magnitude of the interaction terms is greater for macroprudential tools whose main objective 
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is to enhance the financial sector’s resilience. This is not surprising as these tools (capital and 
liquidity requirements) have a more direct impact on banks’ credit supply. 
In the first column of Table 6, we extend the analysis in two ways. First, we consider the 
possibility of asymmetric effects for a tightening and an easing of macroprudential policies. 
Second, we consider the five macroprudential categories described in Table 3. We find, in 
general, the expected signs. In the majority of cases, macroprudential tightening has a 
negative and significant impact on bank-risk, while easing has a positive effect. Similar results 
are obtained in the first column of Table 7 where we use changes in the Z-score as dependent 
variable rather than changes in the EDF. There are, however, cases (depending on the measure 
of bank risk used) in which some macroprudential tools do not produce significant effects on 
a bank’s risk. These cases have to be further investigated because the effect may not be 
homogenous among banks, ie affecting some banks with certain specific characteristics more 
than others. 
Another finding is that the effects are not always symmetric in magnitude for the average 
bank. However, the difference between the coefficients MP_easing and MP_tightening are in 
most cases not statistically significant. There is a slight tendency for asset class measures (such 
as changes in LTV or debt to income ratios) and, to some extent, currency tools to be more 
effective in an easing than in a tightening. On the contrary, reserve requirements seem more 
effective in a tightening but only when EDF is considered as a bank risk indicator. Moreover, 
in this case, the asymmetry needs further analysis by considering how banks with different 
characteristics react to changes in macroprudential tools. 
To this end, we extend the model by inserting interaction terms that are the products of 
macroprudential indicators and bank-specific characteristics (see equation (2)). As pointed out 
in section 3, this is similar to the approach taken by the bank lending channel literature, which 
identifies shifts in the supply of loans by considering a different reaction of banks to monetary 
policy shocks depending on their characteristics. In columns (II) to (V) of Table 6, we report 
estimation results for equation (3) for each bank-specific characteristic, one at a time. Table 7 
does the same but considers the Z-score as a dependent variable. Three main results emerge. 
First, many interaction terms (17 out of 40 for EDF; 24 out of 40 for Z-score) are statistically 
significant, indicating that macroprudential policies have heterogeneous effects across banks. 
Table 6 results indicate that the significance and sign of the coefficients for the five groups of 
macroprudential tools in specifications (II) to (V) are consistent, in general, with those 
expected from theory.  
In particular, banks that are small, weakly capitalised and with a low proportion of deposit 
funding (more wholesale funding) react more strongly to macroprudential shocks. Given that 
small and less strongly capitalised banks suffer from a higher degree of informational friction 
in financial markets, and face higher costs in raising non-secured deposits, then 
macroprudential measures would be expected to have a larger impact on their risk-taking 
capacity. Liquidity does not seem to affect significantly a bank’s risk response to 
macroprudential changes, with the notable exception of a tightening of reserve requirements, 
against which liquid banks seem perfectly insulated. 
Third, controlling for bank characteristics, macroprudential tools are more effective in a 
tightening than in an easing episode. For instance, in Table 6 for EDF, 11 out of 20 interaction 
terms are significant at a conventional level for tightening measures, while it is 6 out of 20 for 
easing interactions. A similar pattern of interaction terms exists for the Z-score in Table 6 (14 
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out of 20 for tightening; 10 out of 20 for easing). Heterogeneity is particularly evident when 
considering banks with a different degree of leverage, in particular for the Z-score and deposit 
ratio for EDF results. The higher effectiveness of tightening measures when bank-specific 
interactions are considered is in line with Claessens et al (2014), Cerutti et al (2016) and 
McDonald (2015). 
5. Robustness checks 
In this section, we perform a number of tests to check the robustness of our results to: i) the 
presence of possible heterogeneity in the effectiveness of macroprudential tools caused by 
different stages of economic and financial development across countries; ii) the effects of the 
GFC in the last part of the sample; iii) the effects of global macroeconomic and financial 
conditions; and iv) possible limits in our data coverage.  
Regarding possible difference in the effectiveness of macroprudential tools across 
jurisdictions, we divided the sample (3,177 banks and 20,870 observations) between advanced 
economies (2,286 banks and 15,144 observations) and EMEs (891 banks and 5,756 
observations).10 This test is particularly relevant as the data for EMEs typically contain more 
gaps and are only available for a limited number of financial intermediaries. The results 
reported in Tables C1-C4 in Annex C indicate that in both groups of countries, 
macroprudential policies have a significant impact on banks’ risk-taking. Figure 5 reports the 
average effect of a macroprudential policy tightening, distinguishing those tools aimed at 
dampening the cycle (Cyclical) from those whose main objective is to enhance the financial 
sector’s resilience (Resilience). For example, on average, macroprudential tightening reduces 
the probability of a bank’s default by 0.35% (first histogram in the left-hand panel). The effect 
is higher in advanced economies (-0.47%) than in EMEs (-0.15%). Similar effects can be 
detected in terms of Z-scores. 
In addition, risk for banks that are small, less well capitalised and with a higher share of 
wholesale funding reacts more strongly to changes in macroprudential tools aggregated into 
an MP index (Tables C1 and C3). In both groups of country, the tools that primarily aim at 
enhancing resilience (MP resilience index) and those that focus above all on taming financial 
booms and busts (MP_cyclical index; see Tables C2 and C4) have an impact on bank risk.  
In the second robustness test, we limit our analysis to the pre-crisis period. Table C5 and 
C6 report the results for the baseline regressions estimated over the period 1990–2007. Even 
after losing one third of the observations, the results are qualitatively very similar.  
In the third test, we add to the equations a complete set of time dummies to capture 
changes in global macroeconomic and financial conditions. The results reported in Tables C7 
and C8 remains very similar. The robustness of the results is also confirmed when we include 
in the specification a full set of country*time fixed effects (and drop the macroeconomic 
controls): sign and significance of the interaction terms between macroprudential index and 
bank-specific characteristics remain qualitatively very similar (see Table C9).  
 
10  The distinction between advanced economies and EMEs is based on the 86th Annual report of the BIS, p. vii. Advanced 
economies are highlighted in italics in Annex A while the remaining economies, which are considered to be EMEs, are not. 
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The above results may also be influenced by differences in the intensity of bank 
supervision, unrelated to macroprudential policies, which could have an impact on the 
amount of risk undertaken (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). In a fourth test, we therefore verify 
whether more permissive legislation on bank activities could have led financial intermediaries 
to take more risks. Following Karolyi and Taboada (2015), we construct a Regulatory Strength 
Index (RSI) using the logarithm of the sum of four indices that measures the quality of bank 
regulation from Barth et al (2013). 11 As the index is available only for the period 1999–2012, 
the number of observations drops to 16,615. Tables C10 and C11 report the results including 
this indicator. We also report, for completeness, the coefficient of the crisis dummy ,k tκ  (used 
in all specifications) which takes the value of 1 in those specific years during which countries 
experienced a banking crisis and zero elsewhere (Valencia and Laeven, 2012). Interestingly, 
the dummy that captures regulatory strength is negatively correlated with both measures of 
bank risk. At the same time, the dummy the captures the crisis picks up the effect of financial 
distress on banks. All other results remain practically unchanged. 
The use of the EDF measure as dependent variable for risk reduces the number of 
observations because this indicator is available only for a limited number of banks. As a final 
robustness check, we run the baseline regressions on a larger sample of financial 
intermediaries using only the Z-score. This allows us to increase the number of banks from 
3,177 to 17,963, and the number of observations from 20,870 to 115,611. The results reported 
in Table C12 are qualitatively very similar. 
6. Conclusions 
The global financial crisis highlighted the importance of financial stability, and hence the need 
for macroprudential policies to achieve that objective. Particularly during and after the crisis, 
many countries began to implement various macroprudential tools to deal with financial 
vulnerabilities and mitigate systemic risk. Recent theoretical and empirical literature has 
focused on various aspects of macroprudential policies, including the effectiveness of those 
policies and their implications for business and financial cycles.  
This paper fills an existing gap in the literature. In particular, while other studies focus on 
the impact of such policies on bank lending, our paper analyses their effectiveness on bank 
risk. We do this in a comprehensive way, exploiting the cross-sectional dimension of countries 
for a large panel of banks operating in 61 advanced economies and emerging market 
economies over the period ranging from 1990 to 2012.  
The paper presents three main results. First, it provides evidence suggesting that 
macroprudential tools are effective in modifying bank risk-taking. Second, the responses to 
 
11  The indices and the question numbers (and their range) in Barth et al (2013) are as follows: I.IV: Overall Restrictions on 
Banking Activities (3-12); IV.III Capital Regulatory Index (0-10); V.I Official Supervisory Power (0-14); VII.VI Private Monitoring 
Index (0-12). The RSI could in principle take a value ranging from 3 (minimum regulation) to 48 (most stringent 
regulation). Barth et al (2013) provide surveys on bank regulation that were conducted in 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011. 
Therefore, in order to not constraint our sample, we simply duplicate the missing years with the latest survey values. Ffor 
2000–2002, use the survey for 1999; for 2004–2006, the survey for 2003; for 2008–2101, the survey for 2007, and for 2011, 




change in macroprudential tools differ among banks depending on their balance sheet 
characteristics. In particular, banks that are small, weakly capitalised and with a higher share 
of wholesale funding react more strongly to changes in these tools. Third, macroprudential 
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Figure 1: Macroprudential measures over time1 
Number of macroprudential policy actions   
 
1 The sample covers 1,047 macroprudential policy actions adopted in 64 countries (29 advanced and 35 emerging market 
economies). The database has been constructed using information in Kuttner and Shim (2016) and Lim et al (2013).  
Sources: IMF; BIS. 
Figure 2:  Cross-sectional dispersion of bank risk measures  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
Note: The coefficient of variation is given by the ratio of the standard error to the mean. The series show the coefficient of 
























































Figure 3. Use of macroprudential instruments. Different kinds of policies 
In percent  






Figure 4. Effect of a macroprudential tool 
tightening: well vs low capitalized banks  




Note:  The graph reports the effect on bank risk of a tightening in 
macroprudential tool. The left part indicates the effects on banks’ 
expected default frequency (left-hand axis), the right part the 
effects on the Z-score (right-hand axis). 






Note:  Resilience macroprudential tools include: a) capital based instruments (countercyclical capital requirements, leverage restrictions, 
general or dynamic provisioning) and b) the establishment of liquidity requirements. Cyclical macroprudential tools consider: c) asset side 
instruments (credit growth limits, maximum debt service-to-income ratio, limits to banks’ exposures to the housing sector as maximum loan 
to value ratio); d) changes in reserve requirements; e) currency instruments (variations in limits on foreign currency exchange mismatches and 
net open positions). 
Source: IMF, BIS, authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 5. Average impact of a macroprudential tightening on bank risk:  
               Advanced vs emerging market economies 
Expected default frequency (left hand side) and Z-score (right hand side)  
All countries  Advanced economies  Emerging market economies 









Note: The Expected default frequency (EDF) represents the probability that a bank will default within one year. The EDF is a well-known, 
forward-looking indicator of risk, computed by Moody’s KMV, which builds on Merton’s model to price corporate bond debt (Merton, 1974). 
The EDF value, expressed as a percentage, is calculated by combining banks’ financial statements with stock market information and Moody’s 
proprietary default database. The Z-score is an alternative measure for risk and it can be summarized as Z=(k+ROA)/σROA, where k is equity 
capital as percent of assets, ROA is average after-tax return as percent on assets, and σROA is standard deviation of the after-tax return on 
assets, as a proxy for return volatility. The Z-score measures the number of standard deviations a return realization has to fall in order to 
deplete equity, under the assumption of normality of banks’ returns. A higher Z-score corresponds to a lower upper bound of insolvency risk, 
a higher z-score therefore implies a lower probability of insolvency risk. To compare the signs of the coefficients in the regressions, we have 
therefore multiplied the Z-score by -1. 

















∆ EDF 20,870 0.116 -0.003 2.094 -32.275 29.65 -0.111 0.157 Moody’s KMV 
Z-score 20,870 -2.685 -2.847 -1.256 -5.298 -4.605 -3.467 -2.078 Authors’ calc. 
∆ EDF_NFS 20,870 -0.069 -0.150 1.546 -6.448 8.236 -1.022 0.771 Moody’s KMV 
DIFF 20,870 -0.012 -0.009 0.025 -0.220 0.235 -0.023 0.001 IMF/WB/OECD 
∆GDP 20,870 2.760 2.720 2.967 -13.130 15.060 1.450 4.350 IMF/WB/OECD 
DEP 20,870 0.000 0.067 1.180 -0.802 0.966 -0.076 0.136 BankScope 
SIZE 20,870 0.000 -0.137 2.192 -16.031 7.932 -1.443 1.365 BankScope 
CAP 20,870 0.000 -0.048 0.176 -0.141 0.879 -0.075 -0.015 BankScope 
LIQ 20,870 0.000 -0.053 0.205 -0.267 0.783 -0.150 0.083 BankScope 
MP index cum 20,870 0.100 0 0.589 -3 3 0 0 See Annex B 
MP cyclical 20,870 0.001 0 0.440 -1 1 0 0 See Annex B 
MP resilience 20,870 0.037 0 0.298 -1 1 0 0 See Annex B 
MP_capital_easing 20,870 0.018 0 0.132 0 1 0 0 See Annex B 
MP_liquidity_easing 20,870 0.011 0 0.106 0 1 0 0 See Annex B 
MP_assets_easing 20,870 0.025 0 0.155 0 1 0 0 See Annex B 
MP_currency_easing 20,870 0.005 0 0.069 0 1 0 0 See Annex B 
MP_reserve_easing 20,870 0.071 0 0.257 0 1 0 0 See Annex B 
MP_capital_tightening 20,870 0.066 0 0.248 0 1 0 0 See Annex B 
MP_liquidity_tightening 20,870 0.012 0 0.109 0 1 0 0 See Annex B 
MP_assets_tightening 20,870 0.08 0 0.271 0 1 0 0 See Annex B 
MP_currency_tightening 20,870 0.012 0 0.110 0 1 0 0 See Annex B 
MP_reserve_tightening 20,870 0.060 0 0.238 0 1 0 0 See Annex B 
Regulatory  strength 16,615 30.39 31 5.718 11 45 28 34 
Barth et al 
(2013) 
Banking crisis 20,870 0.040 0 0.195 0 1 0 0 
Valencia and 
Laeven (2012) 
Note: (1) Bank specific indicators are in mean deviation form.    
where:  
∆EDF=change in the EDF at the bank level (1 year ahead) 
Z-score = indicator of the probability of default which is computed on the base of balance sheet variables 
∆EDF_NFS = EDF change for the non-financial sector at the country level (1 year ahead) 
DIFF = real money market interest rate minus natural rate 
∆GDP = changes in nominal GDP   
DEP  = deposit-to-total liability ratio *100 
SIZE = log of total assets (USD millions) 
CAP = capital-to-total asset ratio *100 
LIQ= cash and securities-to- total asset ratio*100 
MP index = aggregate macroprudential index   
MP cyclical=index for macroprudential policies that aim at dampening cycle 
MP resilience= index for macroprudential policies that aim at increasing system resilience MP_capital = capital based 
macroprudential tool 
MP_liquidity = liquidity based macroprudential tool  
MP_asset = asset side based macroprudential tool  
MP_currency = currency requirement macroprudential tool  
MP_reserve = reserve based macroprudential tool (reserve requirement)  
Regulatory strength = index for overall banking regulation quality Bank crisis = dummy equal to 1 if the country where 





Table 2: Balance sheet characteristics and bank risk profile (1) 
 
Lending Size            Liquidity Capitalization  Deposits Cost to 
income ratio 
ROA ROA 
variability (2)  















Panel A: Distribution by bank risk (one-year ahead EDF)     
A1: Full Sample          
High-risk banks 5.085 15.551 15.523 13.460 70.351 73.425 0.312 83.506 7.356 
Low-risk banks 14.268 16.251 17.923 16.995 67.256 58.835 2.588 41.575 0.070 
A2: Advanced Economies         
High-risk banks 1.519 15.863 12.800 11.717 70.952 74.489 -0.086 76.408 8.318 
Low-risk banks 13.820 16.279 17.510 15.616 67.210 59.631 2.330 41.144 0.060 
A3: Emerging Economies        
High-risk banks 11.525 14.990 20.425 16.602 69.253 71.523 1.030 96.057 5.621 
Low-risk banks 17.491 16.053 20.758 26.476 67.606 53.114 4.365 44.614 0.138 
Panel A: Distribution by bank risk (Z-Score)      
A1: Full Sample          
High-risk banks 6.733 15.965 18.597 9.316 73.891 84.518 -0.138 84.627 0.227 
Low-risk banks 9.310 15.749 11.167 12.339 74.793 58.546 1.045 15.440 4.390 
A2: Advanced Economies         
High-risk banks 4.226 16.173 18.452 8.404 73.176 83.946 0.071 77.466 0.192 
Low-risk banks 8.717 15.703 9.411 11.510 74.933 59.678 0.978 14.071 4.396 
A3: Emerging Economies        
High-risk banks 12.847 15.455 18.952 11.542 75.651 85.906 -0.646 102.450 0.311 
Low-risk banks 12.680 16.003 20.961 16.963 73.992 51.789 1.422 25.356 4.354 
Note: (1) A low-risk bank has an average ratio of the EDF (Z-score) in the first decile of the distribution by bank risk; a high-risk bank an average EDF (Z-score) in the last decile.  







Table 3: Use of macroprudential instruments 










 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
a. Capital based instruments 178 17.0 148 30 
Capital requirement/Risk weights (RW) 127 12.1 108 19 
Provisioning requirement (Prov) 51 4.9 40 11 
b. Liquidity based instruments     
Liquidity requirements (Liq) 64 6.1 26 38 
c. Asset side instruments 207 19.8 146 61 
Credit growth limits (Credit) 51 4.9 31 20 
       Maximum debt-service-to-income ratio and other lending 
criteria (DSTI) 36 3.4 31 5 
Limits on banks’ exposure to the housing sector  11 1.1 7 4 
Maximum loan-to-value ratio and loan prohibition (LTV) 109 10.4 77 32 
d. Reserve requirement (RR) 558 53.3 278 280 
e. Currency instruments 40 3.8 29 11 
Net open position (NOP) 26 2.5 17 9 
Foreign currency lending limits (FCL) 14 1.3 12 2 
Total 1,047 100 627 420 
Notes: The table shows the number of policy actions taken by the countries in the sample. Frequency of use in column (II) 






Table 4: Baseline regression with aggregate macroprudential index 
             
 Dependent variable: Annual change of the expected 
default frequency over a 1 year horizon  
Dependent variable: Annual change of the Z-score 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err 
Dependent variablet-1 0.221 *** 0.003 0.216 *** 0.006 0.894 *** 0.020 0.931 *** 0.125 
∆EDF_NFSt 0.411 *** 0.067 0.395 *** 0.060 0.019 *** 0.005 0.018 *** 0.005 
DIFFt -0.012 ** 0.006 -0.020 ** 0.009 -0.01 ** 0.005 -0.003 ** 0.001 
∆GDPt -0.839  0.703 -0.533  0.671 -0.665 *** 0.065 -0.423 *** 0.113 
SIZEt-1 -0.01 *** 0.003 -0.071 ** 0.036 -0.021 *** 0.003 -0.014 * 0.008 
LIQt-1 -0.118 *** 0.015 -0.090 * 0.051 -0.043 * 0.024 -0.075 ** 0.036 
CAPt-1 -0.158 *** 0.027 -1.027 ** 0.468 -0.86 *** 0.048 -0.517 ** 0.244 
DEPt-1 -0.063 ** 0.031 -0.627 *** 0.216 -0.973 *** 0.030 -0.678 *** 0.240 
MP_indext -0.655 *** 0.066 -0.670 *** 0.237 -0.007 ** 0.003 -0.012 * 0.007 
MP_indext*CAP t-1    3.189 *** 0.357    0.317 *** 0.032 
MP_indext*SIZE t-1    0.491 *** 0.057    0.007 * 0.004 
MP_indext*LIQ t-1    0.201 * 0.116    -0.038  0.074 
MP_indext*DEP t-1    0.194 * 0.117    0.247 *** 0.030 
Sample period 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 
Observations 20,870 20,870 20,870 20,870 
Serial correlation test1 0.110 0.140 0.066 0.127 
Hansen test2 0.560 0.640 0.730 0.760 
Notes: The database is composed of 3,177 banks headquartered in 61 countries. Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank-year level) 
are reported. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The coefficient for the banking crisis 
dummy is not reported. 1 Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second order 
serial correlation. 2 Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. 
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Table 5: Cyclical vs Resilience macroprudential tools 
       
 Dependent variable: Annual 
change of the expected default 
frequency over a 1 year horizon  
Dependent variable: Annual 
change of the Z-score 
 (I) (II) 
 Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err 
Dependent variablet-1 0.089 ** 0.043 0.890 *** 0.067 
∆EDF_NFSt 0.614 *** 0.090 0.032 *** 0.005 
DIFFt -0.041 ** 0.019 -0.018 *** 0.004 
∆GDPt -1.517  2.442 -0.768 *** 0.261 
SIZEt-1 -0.053 * 0.027 -0.012 ** 0.005 
LIQt-1 -0.278 *** 0.015 -0.158 *** 0.060 
CAPt-1 -1.711 *** 0.507 -0.425 *** 0.112 
DEPt-1 -1.299 *** 0.192 -0.547 *** 0.100 
MP_Cyclical indext -0.473 ** 0.194 -0.037 * 0.020 
MP_Resilience_indext -0.158 *** 0.042 -0.066 *** 0.001 
MP_Cyclical indext * CAPt-1 1.510 *** 0.434 0.568 *** 0.145 
MP_Cyclical indext * SIZEt-1 0.125 * 0.067 0.009 * 0.005 
MP_Cyclical indext * LIQt-1 0.551 *** 0.010 0.162 *** 0.040 
MP_Cyclical indext * DEPt-1 0.545 ** 0.237 0.117 * 0.069 
MP_ Resilience indext * CAPt-1 2.056 ** 0.913 0.621 *** 0.183 
MP_ Resilience indext * SIZEt-1 0.088 ** 0.035 0.031 *** 0.006 
MP_ Resilience indext * LIQt-1 0.304 * 0.158 0.104 * 0.058 
MP_ Resilience indext * DEPt-1 1.501 ** 0.737 0.101 *** 0.020 
Sample period 1990-2012 1990-2012 
Observations 20,870 20,870 
Serial correlation test1 0.077 0.275 
Hansen test2 0.358 0.180 
Notes: The database is composed of 3,177 banks headquartered in 61 countries. Robust standard errors (clustered at 
the bank-year level) are reported. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
The coefficient for the banking crisis dummy is not reported. 1Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the errors in 
the first difference regression exhibit no second order serial correlation. 2 Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that 
the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. 




Table 6: Bank-specific characteristics: Impact on EDF 
Dependent variable: 
Annual change of the 
expected default frequency 
over a 1 year horizon 














          
Coeff Std err Coeff Std err Coeff Std err Coeff Std err Coeff Std err 
Dependent variablet-1 0.265*** 0.027 0.235*** 0.010 0.207*** 0.012 0.234*** 0.050 0.248*** 0.001 
∆EDF_NFSt 0.412*** 0.028 0.216*** 0.027 0.247*** 0.026 0.236*** 0.035 0.259*** 0.048 
DIFFt -0.044*** 0.004 -0.027** 0.012 -0.022* 0.012 -0.067*** 0.012 -0.062*** 0.007 
∆GDPt -0.060 1.503 -2.607** 1.140 -2.552** 1.190 -3.156*** 0.396 -1.936** 0.820 
SIZEt-1 -0.020*** 0.003 -0.020 0.025       
LIQt-1 -0.272*** 0.022   -0.840* 0.505     
CAPt-1 -0.704*** 0.273     -0.258*** 0.071   
DEPt-1 -0.458*** 0.054       -1.022*** 0.182 
MP_capital_easingt 0.187*** 0.024 0.105 0.261 0.331** 0.162 0.313*** 0.106 0.473*** 0.126 
MP_liquidity_easingt 0.153 0.168 0.552 0.339 0.346 0.246 0.046 0.098 0.004 0.003 
MP_assets_easingt 0.658*** 0.297 0.657*** 0.207 0.289** 0.144 0.437*** 0.038 3.073*** 0.351 
MP_currency_easingt 0.431*** 0.056 1.033*** 0.440 1.580*** 0.358 1.970*** 0.323 2.408*** 0.529 
MP_reserve_easingt 0.898** 0.362 1.713*** 0.422 1.372*** 0.256 1.185*** 0.289 1.683*** 0.163 
MP_capital_tighteningt -0.475 0.302 -1.023* 0.531 -0.200 0.306 -0.553*** 0.213 -0.689*** 0.265 
MP_liquidity_tighteningt -0.213 0.300 -0.134 0.264 -0.043 0.200 -0.140 0.106 -0.034 0.192 
MP_assets_tighteningt -0.149*** 0.013 -0.634*** 0.194 -0.277 0.124 -0.275*** 0.051 -0.113 0.246 
MP_currency_tighteningt -0.592*** 0.140 -0.817*** 0.266 -0.785*** 0.216 -0.835*** 0.079 -1.462*** 0.441 
MP_reserve_tighteningt -1.487*** 0.379 -1.828*** 0.454 -1.143*** 0.286 -1.955*** 0.275 -1.806*** 0.102 
MP_capital_easingt*Xt-1  
 -0.034 0.098 0.406 1.162 -1.941 1.882 -0.067 0.348 
MP_liquidity_easingt*Xt-1  
  0.146 0.158 -1.448 1.676 -0.430* 0.241 -0.632 0.656 
MP_assets_easingt*Xt-1  
 -0.155** 0.071 2.936 7.861 -0.601*** 0.100 -6.927 4.596 
MP_currency_easingt*Xt-1  
 -0.881*** 0.285 -0.607 1.863 -2.131*** 0.365 -2.609 2.282 
MP_reserve_easingt*Xt-1  
 -0.499*** 0.107 -0.331 0.934 -0.257 0.721 -0.270 0.280 
MP_capital_tighteningt*Xt-1  0.258* 0.132 -0.143 0.868 0.378*** 0.130 0.285 0.872 
MP_liquidity_tighteningt*Xt-1    0.076 0.127 0.112 1.365 -0.648 0.940 1.062*** 0.198 
MP_assets_tighteningt*Xt-1  
   0.062 0.048 -0.760 0.915 0.553*** 0.192 0.583 0.498 
MP_currency_tighteningt*Xt-1  0.164* 0.098 -1.132 2.333 0.665*** 0.244 4.978*** 1.867 
MP_reserve_tighteningt*Xt-1  
 0.426*** 0.126 1.854* 1.034 1.662*** 0.254 1.646*** 0.350 
Sample period 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 
Observations 20,870 20,870 20,870 20,870 20,870 
Serial correlation test1 0.120 0.408 0.342 0.534 0.304 
Hansen test2 0.709 0.690 0.780 0.423 0.760 
Notes: The database is composed of 3,177 banks headquartered in 61 countries. Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank- 
year level) are reported. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The coefficient 
for the banking crisis dummy is not reported. 1 Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the errors in the first difference 
regression exhibit no second order serial correlation. 2 Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the instruments used are not 






Table 7: Bank-specific characteristics: Impact on Z-score 
Dependent variable: Annual 
change of the Z-score  














     
Coeff Std err Coeff Std err Coeff Std err Coeff Std err Coeff Std err 
Dependent variablet-1 0.612*** 0.009 0.655*** 0.007 0.617*** 0.030 0.626*** 0.001 0.702*** 0.039 
∆EDF_NFSt 0.035*** 0.004 0.020*** 0.002 0.061*** 0.007 0.032*** 0.002 0.036*** 0.008 
DIFFt -0.022*** 0.003 -0.018*** 0.001 -0.018*** 0.004 -0.022*** 0.005 -0.010*** 0.002 
∆GDPt -2.014*** 0.196 -1.479*** 0.103 -1.614*** 0.372 -1.258*** 0.234 -1.046*** 0.108 
SIZEt-1 -0.023** 0.011 -0.018*** 0.001       
LIQt-1 -0.059 0.082   0.189 0.153     
CAPt-1 -0.684*** 0.203     -0.520*** 0.164   
DEPt-1 -0.466*** 0.090       -0.379*** 0.027 
MP_capital_easingt 0.037 0.041 0.225*** 0.007 0.072* 0.042 -0.011 0.185 0.064*** 0.013 
MP_liquidity_easingt 0.088 0.058 0.055*** 0.005 -0.031 0.118 -0.034 0.029 -0.016 0.042 
MP_assets_easingt 0.156*** 0.059 0.013 0.032 -0.022 0.036 0.006 0.038 0.039* 0.022 
MP_currency_easingt 0.392*** 0.088 0.065 0.101 0.347*** 0.077 0.166** 0.071 0.401*** 0.039 
MP_reserve_easingt 0.087** 0.044 0.313*** 0.013 -0.045 0.043 0.015 0.026 0.014 0.031 
MP_capital_tighteningt -0.040 0.040 -0.004 0.039 -0.026 0.030 0.018 0.013 -0.016 0.018 
MP_liquidity_tighteningt -0.188*** 0.054 -0.218*** 0.028 -0.369*** 0.057 -0.107*** 0.023 -0.167*** 0.015 
MP_assets_tighteningt -0.154** 0.025 -0.014 0.009 -0.017 0.035 -0.040 0.058 -0.021** 0.009 
MP_currency_tighteningt -0.279*** 0.053 -0.120*** 0.025 -0.181*** 0.044 -0.078*** 0.030 -0.460*** 0.014 
MP_reserve_tighteningt -0.074** 0.033 -0.163*** 0.012 -0.045* 0.028 -0.090*** 0.007 -0.053*** 0.019 
MP_capital_easingt*Xt-1  
 -0.103*** 0.028 0.668 0.413 -1.123 1.703 -0.546*** 0.037 
MP_liquidity_easingt*Xt-1  
 -0.059*** 0.005 -0.147 0.675 0.056 0.160 -0.443*** 0.033 
MP_assets_easingt*Xt-1  
 -0.002 0.012 -0.440* 0.249 -0.748 0.584 -1.244*** 0.114 
MP_currency_easingt*Xt-1  
 -0.062*** 0.012 -0.397 0.481 -1.178*** 0.236 0.545 1.431 
MP_reserve_easingt*Xt-1  
 -0.080*** 0.004 -0.494* 0.272 0.245 0.159 0.547 0.568 
MP_capital_tighteningt*Xt-1  
 0.000 0.012 1.351*** 0.384 0.869*** 0.108 0.444*** 0.099 
MP_liquidity_tighteningt*Xt-1  
 0.045*** 0.001 0.315 0.369 0.306*** 0.097 -0.086 0.073 
MP_assets_tighteningt*Xt-1  
 -0.016* 0.009 -0.512 0.348 0.307*** 0.070 -0.087 0.096 
MP_currency_tighteningt*Xt-1  
 -0.007 0.027 1.126*** 0.347 1.718*** 0.430 0.390*** 0.104 
MP_reserve_tighteningt*Xt-1  
 0.040*** 0.006 0.682** 0.332 1.567*** 0.117 1.131*** 0.044 
Sample period 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 
Observations 20,870 20,870 20,870 20,870 20,870 
Serial correlation test1 0.242 0.104 0.270 0.119 0.101 
Hansen test2 0.699 0.690 0.590 0.760 0.600 
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank-year level) are reported. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The coefficient for the banking crisis dummy is not reported. 1 Reports p-values for the null 
hypothesis that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second order serial correlation. 2 Reports p-values for the 
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AE 2.70 5.05 15.72 13.10 21.40 18.80 67.20 0.84 2.95 2.22 0.00 19 0.60 
AR 4.40 11.25 15.47 8.60 14.00 31.80 71.40 1.84 1.85 5.28 0.08 8 0.25 
AT 2.00 2.43 15.91 5.90 13.40 19.40 62.20 0.90 3.12 2.50 0.09 31 0.98 
AU 3.20 5.19 16.54 12.00 8.60 8.90 73.10 0.80 3.38 3.86 0.00 27 0.85 
BE 1.70 2.77 17.65 5.30 14.70 17.90 68.70 1.09 2.30 2.35 0.05 21 0.66 
BH 5.20 2.51 15.22 3.10 19.30 21.50 61.00 1.86 2.51 0.20 0.00 15 0.47 
BR 3.30 22.88 15.84 17.20 14.70 25.00 64.00 2.58 2.54 8.27 0.02 34 1.07 
CA 2.00 2.93 16.81 11.40 12.10 14.80 70.90 0.86 3.18 5.60 0.00 21 0.66 
CH 1.80 1.65 15.07 7.60 28.60 26.90 58.20 0.91 2.78 1.54 0.06 49 1.54 
CL 4.50 5.02 15.87 16.10 10.50 15.20 71.90 0.37 3.26 2.56 0.00 13 0.41 
CN 10.20 2.87 18.92 23.00 7.80 24.80 87.20 0.68 3.03 1.55 0.00 26 0.82 
CO 4.30 9.04 15.20 17.00 18.40 17.80 72.30 1.31 3.04 2.46 0.02 13 0.41 
CZ 2.50 4.40 15.97 10.10 8.20 17.80 82.50 0.51 2.44 3.51 0.00 10 0.31 
DE 1.50 3.00 15.97 4.70 13.60 23.00 56.60 2.39 2.53 3.71 0.07 88 2.77 
DK 1.20 2.85 13.85 9.20 11.90 18.60 77.40 1.05 2.47 2.64 0.07 72 2.27 
EG 4.60 6.94 14.82 9.20 13.50 26.70 81.60 1.78 2.28 1.48 0.00 15 0.47 
ES 2.10 3.44 16.92 9.00 7.90 16.70 76.90 0.68 3.17 1.94 0.08 35 1.10 
FI 2.50 3.43 15.24 8.30 28.40 14.20 62.40 0.39 2.53 1.69 0.00 22 0.69 
FR 1.50 3.12 15.93 3.00 8.80 13.70 71.50 0.83 1.25 3.46 0.06 127 4.00 
GB 2.50 4.22 15.95 6.80 28.30 28.90 53.30 0.97 2.52 3.39 0.07 132 4.15 






 (Annex A - continued) 
GR 1.10 4.60 16.47 15.30 9.50 19.90 82.20 2.69 1.45 5.76 0.08 25 0.79 
HK 4.20 2.13 15.45 9.20 22.50 26.00 71.50 0.93 3.20 3.69 0.00 30 0.94 
HU 1.70 7.35 15.51 15.00 8.20 16.70 61.70 1.71 2.37 4.60 0.08 9 0.28 
ID 5.10 10.05 14.63 21.30 12.00 23.50 80.40 2.91 2.18 6.32 0.03 50 1.57 
IE 4.90 3.24 17.68 12.70 4.80 21.40 73.50 1.28 2.05 2.66 0.05 14 0.44 
IL 4.00 4.79 16.93 8.00 8.90 17.00 76.30 2.07 3.07 3.56 0.00 10 0.31 
IN 7.40 10.17 16.05 18.90 11.30 16.00 75.50 1.85 2.93 6.11 0.00 61 1.92 
IS 4.20 11.72 16.39 38.60 13.40 19.10 38.70 0.42 1.99 1.58 0.21 9 0.28 
IT 0.70 3.72 16.45 10.30 11.50 23.80 62.80 0.66 2.91 2.32 0.06 104 3.27 
JO 5.40 3.75 15.00 10.80 13.10 21.10 80.60 0.57 2.65 1.38 0.00 17 0.54 
JP 0.80 0.44 16.98 1.80 9.70 12.70 83.70 1.19 2.71 2.80 0.03 200 6.30 
KR 4.40 5.07 15.98 7.80 18.50 22.60 63.30 2.16 2.21 4.28 0.03 68 2.14 
KW 3.80 2.53 14.69 4.60 34.80 20.40 57.40 1.63 1.73 1.61 0.00 18 0.57 
LK 5.80 14.71 13.23 15.50 15.40 15.70 59.90 1.18 3.18 2.11 0.00 14 0.44 
LU 3.60 2.82 15.30 10.30 26.50 28.40 66.00 1.18 2.56 2.22 0.03 9 0.28 
MA 4.50 3.27 15.92 14.50 8.80 23.50 84.30 0.17 3.70 0.45 0.00 12 0.38 
MX 2.70 11.73 15.58 17.60 19.80 29.60 64.90 1.71 1.94 3.34 0.01 12 0.38 
MY 5.10 3.26 14.78 11.90 37.00 18.40 62.90 1.03 2.93 3.68 0.01 30 0.94 
NL 1.80 2.77 16.90 11.80 23.40 26.00 60.30 1.44 2.71 2.27 0.07 24 0.76 
NO 1.80 4.74 14.85 9.00 9.80 7.70 62.80 1.57 3.12 3.96 0.00 52 1.64 
NZ 2.80 5.35 16.04 8.10 5.50 7.40 81.50 4.71 3.01 3.12 0.00 5 0.16 
PA 5.50 4.81 12.61 17.70 9.30 17.50 80.60 1.27 3.81 0.65 0.00 1 0.03 
PE 5.50 5.91 14.97 14.80 10.20 22.10 81.80 2.09 2.71 5.54 0.00 13 0.41 
PH 4.70 7.19 14.50 9.70 16.30 27.10 75.40 1.51 3.34 6.01 0.02 32 1.01 








(Annex A - continued) 
PL 3.90 5.86 15.68 15.10 10.90 16.30 80.60 1.10 2.77 3.99 0.00 33 1.04 
PT 1.10 3.00 16.20 8.00 12.20 23.60 70.50 1.20 2.69 4.77 0.07 20 0.63 
QA 14.70 4.90 16.04 22.80 17.40 20.00 76.20 0.49 3.45 0.40 0.00 5 0.16 
RU 3.40 4.82 16.20 16.70 15.40 23.20 60.40 2.86 2.33 6.43 0.14 27 0.85 
SA 6.30 1.24 17.02 12.90 13.30 14.30 81.80 0.86 2.77 0.40 0.00 8 0.25 
SE 2.40 3.36 16.76 8.50 13.10 25.10 60.30 2.12 2.24 3.50 0.07 21 0.66 
SG 5.80 1.83 15.55 9.50 32.90 20.40 63.00 0.31 3.48 3.25 0.00 29 0.91 
SI -0.30 1.69 15.66 2.70 7.00 9.80 78.90 4.20 1.18 4.81 0.22 2 0.06 
SK 4.10 3.28 15.59 5.90 8.20 15.30 78.80 2.46 2.48 16.25 0.03 5 0.16 
TH 4.20 3.78 14.56 10.10 24.50 14.60 69.20 2.05 1.80 4.02 0.03 51 1.61 
TR 4.60 32.78 16.08 21.70 14.60 20.40 72.30 2.02 2.18 3.21 0.06 30 0.94 
TW 4.00 2.98 15.70 5.90 20.60 19.40 63.50 1.17 2.62 2.60 0.00 67 2.11 
US 2.30 2.84 15.49 10.60 9.90 9.70 72.50 1.57 3.00 6.74 0.08 1,212 38.15 
VE 3.50 15.24 14.96 30.30 10.40 25.00 85.40 1.68 2.22 7.19 0.00 11 0.35 
ZA 3.50 8.94 14.59 9.50 40.80 22.80 56.80 0.90 2.56 5.48 0.00 26 0.82 
ZW -10.10 123.07 11.67 38.90 19.30 41.80 64.60 1.66 0.82 0.48 0.00 4 0.13 
              
Total 2.70 4.41 15.77 9.70 14.20 16.70 71.40 1.39 2.70 4.48 0.05 3,177 100.00 
Sources: Bloomberg, OECD, Eurostat, Datastream, Moody's KMV, Creditedge and BIS. Advanced economies are indicated in italics. Notes: (1) The Z-score is an indicator of the probability 
of default which is computed on the base of balance sheet variables. The methodology is described in Altman et al. (1994). (2) EDF change for the non-financial sector in a country. The 






Annex B: Additional details on the construction of the database on 
macroprudential tools 
Our primary data sources for macroprudential measures are Shim et al (2013) and Lim et al (2011, 
2013).  
The first data base covers policy actions on housing markets for 60 economies worldwide from 
January 1990 (or earliest date available) to June 2012. It draws on a variety of sources including official 
documents from central banks’ and regulatory authorities’ annual reports, financial stability reports, 
monetary policy bulletins. Shim et al (2013) complement and cross-check official sources and 
documents with Borio and Shim (2007), survey by the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) 
on macroprudential policy conducted in December 2009, Hilbers et al (2005), Crowe et al (2011), Lim et 
al (2011), and Tovar et al (2012). Thus, the database covers a wide range of countries and measures, as 
well as a long time span on macro-prudential measures. The policy actions in the database are 
categorized under general and targeted credit policy measures including minimum reserve 
requirements, liquidity requirements and limits on credit growth, maximum loan-to-value ratios, 
maximum debt-service-to-income ratios, risk weights on housing loans, provisioning requirements 
(general loan-loss provisioning ratios and specific provisioning ratios applied to housing loans) and 
exposure limits on banks to the housing sector. While the main aim of Shim et al (2013) is to document 
policy actions related to the housing market, they also include measure in the data set even if a central 
bank or another other authority changes policy decision for reasons other than the state of the housing 
market. Thus, their data set contains prudential measures taken from both microprudential and 
macroprudential perspectives.  
The second study that we use to construct macro-prudential measures is Lim et al (2013) which is 
based on the 2010 IMF survey on Financial Stability and Macroprudential Policy. Lim et al (2013) update 
and extend the survey to assess if institutional arrangements can affect the timely use of macro-
prudential policy instruments by evaluating policy response time under different institutional 
arrangements for a sample of 39 countries. Another study that also uses the IMF survey in 2010 is Lim 
et al (2011) that provides a comprehensive empirical study on the effectiveness of macroprudential 
instruments by using data from 49 countries over the period of 2000-2010. The IMF survey and both 
reference studies identify 10 instruments that have been most frequently applied to achieve macro-
prudential objective that is “to limit the risk of widespread disruptions to the provision of financial 
services and thereby minimize the impact of such disruptions on the economy as a whole.” (IMF, 2011, 
pp 7). These instruments are classified as credit-related ( i.e., caps on the loan-to-value ratio, caps on 
the debt-to-income ratio, caps on foreign currency lending and ceilings on credit or credit growth); 
liquidity-related (i.e. limits on net open currency positions/currency mismatch, limits on maturity 
mismatch and reserve requirements), and capital-related (i.e. countercyclical/time-varying capital 
requirements, time-varying/dynamic provisioning, and restrictions on profit distribution) measures. 
Using the two sources above we construct a database of macro-prudential measures for 64 
countries from 1990 to 2012. The macro-prudential measures are classified under 10 categories 
including credit growth limits (Credit), liquidity requirements (Liq), maximum debt-service-to-income 
ratio and other lending criteria (DSTI), capital requirement/risk weights (RW), provisioning requirement 
(Prov), limits on banks’ exposure to the housing sector (Expo), reserve requirement (RR), maximum loan-
to-value ratio and loan prohibition (LTV), limits on net open position (NOP), and foreign currency 
lending limits (FCL). If a policy action is covered by both Shim et al (2013) and Lim et al (2013), then we 
compare and cross-checks both data bases, and include additional measures such as limits on net open 
positions and foreign currency lending as these instruments are not directly or indirectly aiming policy 
actions on housing markets. The set of instruments covered here would capture broad categories of 
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systemic risk that could be linked to risk-taking channel such as risks arising from strong credit growth 
and credit-driven asset price inflation, excessive leverage and the consequent deleveraging, systemic 
liquidity risk, and risks related to large and volatile capital flows, including foreign currency lending.       
Given the heterogeneity across policy instruments and actions, we follow Kuttner and Shim (2013) 
to create monthly variables that take on three discrete values: 1 for tightening actions, –1 for loosening 
actions and 0 for no change. Since the frequency of bank level and macroeconomic data used in our 
study is annual, then the monthly observations are summed to create yearly time series. Thus, both 
policy action’s intensity and their directions would be captured by summing monthly data over each 
year which could take value of -1 or 1; -2 or 2; -3 or 3, and up to -12 or 12 or more. When 
macroprudential index is constructed for each instrument, and tightening and easing actions are 
aggregated over the year, then actions in opposite directions may cancel each other leaving with no net 
change. In final analysis, we investigate also the impact of easing and tightening separately using 
indicator variable 0 or 1 (no change or change in policy measure).  
Based on our coding we observe 1,047 policy actions associated with ten different types of 
macroprudential tools (see Table 3). Among these policy measures reserve requirements are the most 
frequently used ones followed by loan-to-value ratio and capital requirements/risk weights. The reason 
for the frequent changes in reserve requirements is that this policy tools could be used for broad 
purposed, and could directly influence the liquidity conditions in the market. Additionally, in same cases 
in emerging economies, it also serves as capital flow management device by setting higher rates on 
foreign currency and external short term funding of the banking sector or longer maintenance period 




Annex C: Robustness checks 
Table C1: Baseline regression with aggregate macroprudential index (only advanced economies) 
             
 Dependent variable: Annual change of the expected 
default frequency over a 1 year horizon  
Dependent variable: Annual  
change of the Z-score 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err 
Dependent variablet-1 0.350 *** 0.0184 0.343 *** 0.0136 0.944 *** 0.0519 0.976 *** 0.0178 
∆EDF_NFSt 0.264 *** 0.0530 0.350 *** 0.0772 0.029 *** 0.0068 0.006 *** 0.0020 
DIFFt -0.099 ** 0.0488 -0.022 *** 0.0055 -0.024 ** 0.0095 -0.010 ** 0.0046 
∆GDPt -0.840  1.5823 -1.186  1.4491 -0.772 *** 0.2571 -0.475 *** 0.0402 
SIZEt-1 -0.015 ** 0.0060 -0.027 *** 0.0050 -0.014 ** 0.0061 -0.027 *** 0.0048 
LIQt-1 -0.265 ** 0.1071 -0.191 *** 0.0349 -0.135 *** 0.0337 -0.130 *** 0.0077 
CAPt-1 -0.586 *** 0.0211 -0.778 *** 0.1834 -0.426 *** 0.1455 -0.832 *** 0.1898 
DEPt-1 -0.472 *** 0.1722 -0.558 *** 0.1869 -0.613 *** 0.1007 -0.999 *** 0.1797 
MP_indext -0.469 ** 0.1958 -0.672 * 0.3939 -0.072 ** 0.0364 -0.169 *** 0.0193 
MP_indext*CAP t-1    1.629 * 0.8792    0.726 ** 0.3232 
MP_indext*SIZE t-1    0.189 *** 0.0666    0.066 ** 0.0273 
MP_indext*LIQ t-1    0.430 ** 0.1852    0.256 *** 0.0329 
MP_indext*DEP t-1    1.235  1.1886    0.476 *** 0.1613 
Sample period 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 
Observations 15,114 15,114 15,114 15,114 
Serial correlation test1 0.076 0.078 0.16 0.138 
Hansen test2 0.229 0.11 0.123 0.11 
Notes: The database is composed of 2,286 banks headquartered in advanced economies. Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank 
year level) are reported. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The coefficient for the 
banking crisis dummy is not reported. 1 Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no 





Table C2: Cyclical vs Resilience macroprudential tools (only advanced economies) 
       
 Dependent variable: Annual 
change of the expected default 
frequency over a 1 year horizon  
Dependent variable: Annual 
change of the Z-score 
 (I) (II) 
 Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err 
Dependent variablet-1 0.286 *** 0.0147 0.948 *** 0.1653 
∆EDF_NFSt 0.430 ** 0.1740 0.035 *** 0.0095 
DIFFt -0.090 *** 0.0176 -0.035 *** 0.0075 
∆GDPt -1.276  1.8909 -0.571 ** 0.2319 
SIZEt-1 -0.023 ** 0.0105 -0.010 *** 0.0037 
LIQt-1 -0.298 ** 0.1423 -0.260 * 0.1458 
CAPt-1 -0.785 ** 0.3883 -0.257 *** 0.0096 
DEPt-1 -0.575 ** 0.2649 -0.483 *** 0.0925 
MP_cyclical indext -0.596 *** 0.0659 -0.102 *** 0.0162 
MP_resilience_indext -0.246 *** 0.0344 -0.066 *** 0.0229 
MP_Cyclical indext * CAPt-1 1.358 *** 0.1562 0.128  0.0875 
MP_Cyclical indext * SIZEt-1 0.160 *** 0.0287 0.076 *** 0.0013 
MP_Cyclical indext * LIQt-1 0.747  0.4618 0.151  0.1494 
MP_Cyclical indext * DEPt-1 0.542 ** 0.2677 0.066 ** 0.0290 
MP_ Resilience indext * CAPt-1 2.673 *** 0.6203 0.212 ** 0.0933 
MP_ Resilience indext * SIZEt-1 0.062 *** 0.0180 0.044 *** 0.0138 
MP_ Resilience indext * LIQt-1 0.706 ** 0.3490 1.561 ** 0.6202 
MP_ Resilience indext * DEPt-1 1.689 ** 0.7612 0.185 *** 0.0521 
Sample period 1990-2012 1990-2012 
Observations 15,114 15,114 
Serial correlation test1 0.089 0.129 
Hansen test2 0.558 0.278 
Notes: The database is composed of 2,286 banks headquartered in advanced economies. Robust standard errors 
(clustered at the bank year level) are reported. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively. The coefficient for the banking crisis dummy is not reported. 1Reports p-values for the null hypothesis 
that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second order serial correlation. 2 Reports p-values for the null 
hypothesis that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. 








Table C3: Baseline regression with aggregate macroprudential index (only emerging market economies) 
             
 Dependent variable: Annual change of the expected 
default frequency over a 1 year horizon  
Dependent variable: Annual  
change of the Z-score 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err 
Dependent variablet-1 0.067 *** 0.003 0.218 *** 0.036 0.887 *** 0.059 0.880 *** 0.063 
∆EDF_NFSt 0.895 *** 0.026 0.702 *** 0.254 0.038 ** 0.015 0.032 *** 0.007 
DIFFt -0.064 *** 0.019 -0.014 ** 0.007 -0.001 *** 0.000 -0.002 * 0.001 
∆GDPt -0.952 * 0.522 -1.201 * 0.729 -0.441 * 0.240 -0.313 ** 0.151 
SIZEt-1 -0.060 *** 0.017 -0.113 *** 0.039 -0.012 *** 0.004 -0.016 *** 0.003 
LIQt-1 -0.009  0.088 0.199  0.360 -0.236 *** 0.059 -0.383 ** 0.150 
CAPt-1 -1.849 ** 0.921 -2.319 *** 0.579 -0.733 ** 0.287 -0.362 ** 0.178 
DEPt-1 -1.784 ** 0.774 -1.730 *** 0.439 -0.868 *** 0.254 -0.555 *** 0.175 
MP_indext -0.158 *** 0.017 -0.883 *** 0.051 -0.073 *** 0.005 -0.024 ** 0.012 
MP_indext*CAP t-1    2.784 *** 0.056    0.556 *** 0.188 
MP_indext*SIZE t-1    0.303 ** 0.146    0.004 *** 0.000 
MP_indext*LIQ t-1    0.340  0.343    0.095 * 0.055 
MP_indext*DEP t-1       0.679 *** 0.022       0.509 *** 0.128 
Sample period 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 
Observations 5,756 5,756 5,756 5,756 
Serial correlation test1 0.089 0.156 0.359 0.348 
Hansen test2 0.706 0.169 0.177 0.248 
Notes: The database is composed of 891 banks headquartered in emerging market economies. Robust standard errors (clustered at the 
bank year level) are reported. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The coefficient for 
the banking crisis dummy is not reported. 1 Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit 






Table C4: Cyclical vs Resilience macroprudential tools (only emerging market economies) 
       
 Dependent variable: Annual 
change of the expected default 
frequency over a 1 year horizon  
Dependent variable: Annual 
change of the Z-score 
 (I) (II) 
 Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err 
Dependent variablet-1 0.0225 ** 0.0106 0.8579 *** 0.0401 
∆EDF_NFSt 0.4014 *** 0.0892 0.0572 *** 0.0068 
DIFFt -0.0050 ** 0.0022 -0.0043 *** 0.0015 
∆GDPt -1.3650 * 0.7523 -0.6346 *** 0.0489 
SIZEt-1 -0.0684 ** 0.0270 -0.0313 *** 0.0022 
LIQt-1 -0.2692 *** 0.0404 -0.2651 *** 0.0873 
CAPt-1 -0.1816 *** 0.0620 -0.3468 *** 0.0882 
DEPt-1 -0.0492  0.0881 -0.3023 ** 0.1262 
MP_cyclical indext -0.2715 *** 0.0557 -0.0885 *** 0.0142 
MP_resilience_indext -0.0129 ** 0.0052 -0.0532 *** 0.0004 
MP_Cyclical indext *C APt-1 4.5583 *** 0.6487 0.5115 ** 0.2416 
MP_Cyclical indext * SIZEt-1 0.4135 *** 0.0753 0.0430 *** 0.0137 
MP_Cyclical indext * LIQt-1 0.0933  0.4506 0.0967  0.1879 
MP_Cyclical indext * DEPt-1 1.0434 *** 0.1613 0.1406 *** 0.0217 
MP_ Resilience indext * CAPt-1 1.5232 *** 0.3118 0.5416 *** 0.1774 
MP_ Resilience indext * SIZEt-1 0.0447 *** 0.0035 0.0242 *** 0.0009 
MP_ Resilience indext * LIQt-1 0.9982 *** 0.0235 0.0001  0.0093 
MP_ Resilience indext * DEPt-1 0.5627 *** 0.0440 0.1936 *** 0.0073 
Sample period 1990-2012 1990-2012 
Observations 5,756 5,756 
Serial correlation test1 0.163 0.406 
Hansen test2 0.158 0.100 
Notes: The database is composed of 891 banks headquartered in emerging market economies. Robust standard errors 
(clustered at the bank year level) are reported. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively. The coefficient for the banking crisis dummy is not reported. 1Reports p-values for the null hypothesis 
that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second order serial correlation. 2 Reports p-values for the null 
hypothesis that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. 





Table C5: Baseline regression with aggregate macroprudential index (only pre-crisis period) 
             
 Dependent variable: Annual change of the expected 
default frequency over a 1 year horizon  
Dependent variable: Annual 
 change of the Z-score 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err 
Dependent variablet-1 0.097 ** 0.039 0.104 *** 0.018 0.921 *** 0.015 0.946 *** 0.018 
∆EDF_NFSt 0.176 ** 0.069 0.387 ** 0.173 0.012 ** 0.005 0.006 * 0.003 
DIFFt -0.014 *** 0.001 -0.014 ** 0.006 -0.004 ** 0.002 -0.007 *** 0.002 
∆GDPt -1.997  1.546 -1.562  2.095 -0.941 ** 0.411 -0.959 *** 0.359 
SIZEt-1 -0.006  0.012 0.002  0.014 -0.020 ** 0.010 -0.018 ** 0.008 
LIQt-1 -0.192 *** 0.010 -0.154  0.197 -0.058 ** 0.029 0.019  0.045 
CAPt-1 -0.770 ** 0.388 -9.946 *** 1.978 -0.793 *** 0.073 -0.622 *** 0.052 
DEPt-1 -0.777 * 0.433 -2.186 *** 0.627 -0.972 ** 0.396 -0.793 ** 0.339 
MP_indext -0.053 ** 0.027 -0.066 ** 0.029 -0.036 ** 0.017 -0.097 ** 0.039 
MP_indext*CAP t-1    1.887 *** 0.591    0.234 *** 0.052 
MP_indext*SIZE t-1    0.051 *** 0.015    0.038 *** 0.008 
MP_indext*LIQ t-1    0.213 * 0.119    0.190 ** 0.087 
MP_indext*DEP t-1      2.045 *** 0.757      0.037 * 0.020 
Sample period 1990-2007 1990-2007 1990-2007 1990-2007 
Observations 13,460 13,460 13,460 13,460 
Serial correlation test1 0.061 0.056 0.064 0.104 
Hansen test2 0.155 0.17 0.147 0.429 
Notes: The database is composed of 3,177 banks headquartered in 61 countries. We include only observations for the pre-crisis period. 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank year level) are reported. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, 
and 1% respectively. The coefficient for the banking crisis dummy is  not reported. 1 Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the errors 
in the first difference regression exhibit no second order serial correlation. 2 Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the instruments 





Table C6: Cyclical vs Resilience macroprudential tools (only pre-crisis period) 
       
 Dependent variable: Annual 
change of the expected default 
frequency over a 1 year horizon  
Dependent variable: Annual 
change of the Z-score 
 (I) (II) 
 Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err 
Dependent variablet-1 0.182 *** 0.0117 0.894 *** 0.0644 
∆EDF_NFSt 0.138 ** 0.0698 0.041 *** 0.0136 
DIFFt -0.007 * 0.0038 -0.021 *** 0.0038 
∆GDPt -1.945  1.1855 -0.864 * 0.4827 
SIZEt-1 -0.013 ** 0.0068 -0.011 * 0.0057 
LIQt-1 -0.242 *** 0.0070 -0.101  0.1319 
CAPt-1 -0.842 ** 0.3602 -0.355 ** 0.1588 
DEPt-1 -0.795 ** 0.3959 -0.470  0.2918 
MP_Cyclical indext -0.742 *** 0.0786 -0.023 ** 0.0096 
MP_Resilience_indext -0.043 ** 0.0175 -0.019 *** 0.0026 
MP_Cyclical indext * CAPt-1 1.666 *** 0.0281 0.579 *** 0.0910 
MP_Cyclical indext * SIZEt-1 0.242 * 0.1288 0.010  0.0099 
MP_Cyclical indext * LIQt-1 0.039  0.0358 0.148 ** 0.0695 
MP_Cyclical indext * DEPt-1 0.321 *** 0.0700 0.100  0.0657 
MP_ Resilience indext * CAPt-1 0.836 ** 0.3958 0.587 ** 0.2558 
MP_ Resilience indext * SIZEt-1 0.035 * 0.0198 0.020 *** 0.0038 
MP_ Resilience indext * LIQt-1 0.347 *** 0.1077 0.161 *** 0.0315 
MP_ Resilience indext * DEPt-1 0.961 *** 0.3248 0.181 ** 0.0858 
Sample period 1990-2007 1990-2007 
Observations 13,460 13,460 
Serial correlation test1 0.069 0.053 
Hansen test2 0.758 0.114 
Notes: The database is composed of 3,177 banks headquartered in 61 countries. We include only observations for the 
pre-crisis period. Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank year level) are reported. The symbols *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The coefficient for the banking crisis dummy is not 
reported. 1Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second 
order serial correlation. 2 Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the instruments used are not correlated with the 
residuals. 









Table C7: Baseline regression with aggregate macroprudential index (including time dummies) 
             
 Dependent variable: Annual change of the expected 
default frequency over a 1 year horizon  
Dependent variable: Annual  
change of the Z-score 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err 
Dependent variablet-1 0.258 *** 0.034 0.167 *** 0.048 0.880 *** 0.077 0.900 *** 0.190 
∆EDF_NFSt 0.770 *** 0.099 1.318 *** 0.055 0.088 *** 0.017 0.081 *** 0.020 
DIFFt -0.005 *** 0.002 -0.035 ** 0.014 -0.015 ** 0.007 -0.015 *** 0.004 
∆GDPt 0.644  1.199 -1.200  1.103 -1.548 *** 0.136 -1.248 ** 0.558 
SIZEt-1 -0.022  0.014 -0.092 *** 0.021 -0.028 *** 0.004 -0.019  0.015 
LIQt-1 -0.232 *** 0.034 -0.599 *** 0.120 -0.041 ** 0.018 -0.070  0.059 
CAPt-1 -0.374 *** 0.145 -1.534 *** 0.192 -1.082 *** 0.122 -0.579 ** 0.226 
DEPt-1 -0.174 ** 0.075 -1.123 *** 0.243 -1.170 *** 0.215 -0.753 ** 0.312 
MP_indext -0.346 ** 0.161 -1.702 * 0.879 -0.023 ** 0.010 -0.062 ** 0.031 
MP_indext*CAP t-1    14.992 ** 6.133    0.129 * 0.067 
MP_indext*SIZE t-1    0.404 ** 0.171    0.006 ** 0.003 
MP_indext*LIQ t-1    3.375  2.803    0.152  0.095 
MP_indext*DEP t-1    11.556 ** 5.139    0.340 ** 0.163 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes 
Sample period 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 
Observations 20,870 20,870 20,870 20,870 
Serial correlation test1 0.092 0.096 0.084 0.126 
Hansen test2 0.716 0.720 0.054 0.178 
Notes: The database is composed of 3,177 banks headquartered in 61 countries. Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank year level) 
are reported. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The coefficient for the banking crisis 
dummy is not reported. 1 Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second order 





Table C8: Cyclical vs Resilience macroprudential tools (including time dummies) 
       
 Dependent variable: Annual 
change of the expected default 
frequency over a 1 year horizon  
Dependent variable: Annual 
change of the Z-score 
 (I) (II) 
 Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err 
Dependent variablet-1 0.201 *** 0.0215 0.903 *** 0.2174 
∆EDF_NFSt 0.540 *** 0.1792 0.125 *** 0.0414 
DIFFt -0.029 *** 0.0082 -0.025 ** 0.0100 
∆GDPt -1.237  1.1132 -1.933 * 1.1591 
SIZEt-1 -0.064 * 0.0382 -0.017 ** 0.0083 
LIQt-1 -0.556 ** 0.2278 -0.218 ** 0.1048 
CAPt-1 -2.117 *** 0.5128 -0.488 *** 0.0530 
DEPt-1 -1.680 *** 0.6314 -0.607 *** 0.0951 
MP_Cyclical indext -1.040 ** 0.4599 -0.200 *** 0.0330 
MP_Resilience_indext -0.068 * 0.0350 -0.063 ** 0.0295 
MP_Cyclical indext * CAPt-1 3.502 *** 0.5582 1.141 *** 0.0188 
MP_Cyclical indext * SIZEt-1 0.317 ** 0.1286 0.058  0.0385 
MP_Cyclical indext * LIQt-1 0.103 * 0.0624 0.345 ** 0.1373 
MP_Cyclical indext * DEPt-1 0.891 ** 0.4496 0.084  0.0562 
MP_ Resilience indext * CAPt-1 1.357 *** 0.5073 0.719 *** 0.0400 
MP_ Resilience indext * SIZEt-1 0.019  0.0397 0.024 ** 0.0114 
MP_ Resilience indext * LIQt-1 0.297 * 0.1667 0.219 * 0.1274 
MP_ Resilience indext * DEPt-1 1.383 ** 0.5877 0.238 *** 0.0397 
Time dummies yes yes 
Sample period 1990-2012 1990-2012 
Observations 20,870 20,870 
Serial correlation test1 0.152 0.294 
Hansen test2 0.738 0.141 
Notes: The database is composed of 3,177 banks headquartered in 61 countries. Robust standard errors (clustered at 
the bank year level) are reported. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
The coefficient for the banking crisis dummy is not reported. 1Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the errors in 
the first difference regression exhibit no second order serial correlation. 2 Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that 
the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. 






Table C9: Baseline regression with aggregate macroprudential index (including country*time dummies) 
             
 Dependent variable: Annual change of the expected 
default frequency over a 1 year horizon  
Dependent variable: Annual  
change of the Z-score 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err 
Dependent variablet-1 0.240 ** 0.1187 0.253 *** 0.0095 0.346 *** 0.0650 0.898 *** 0.1027 
SIZEt-1 -0.016 * 0.0080 -0.137 * 0.0786 -0.034 ** 0.0136 -0.021 *** 0.0013 
LIQt-1 -0.045 * 0.0235 -0.255  0.4417 -0.958 ** 0.4120 -0.040 * 0.0207 
CAPt-1 -0.857 * 0.4446 -1.320 ** 0.5482 -0.505 ** 0.2034 -0.482 *** 0.0195 
DEPt-1 -0.660 ** 0.3117 -0.582 * 0.3117 -0.458 *** 0.1709 -0.572 * 0.3117 
MP_indext*CAP t-1 0.824 ** 0.3892    0.963 ** 0.4728    
MP_indext*SIZE t-1 0.012 ** 0.0048    0.041 * 0.0247    
MP_indext*LIQ t-1 0.358 ** 0.1683    0.223 ** 0.1067    
MP_indext*DEP t-1 1.290 ** 0.5108    0.025 ** 0.0124    
MP_Cyclical indext * CAPt-1    0.659 *** 0.1603    0.144 *** 0.0049 
MP_Cyclical indext * SIZEt-1    0.057 ** 0.0226    0.005  0.0047 
MP_Cyclical indext * LIQt-1    0.287  0.2443    0.033 *** 0.0100 
MP_Cyclical indext * DEPt-1    0.516 *** 0.0010    0.175 *** 0.0047 
MP_ Resilience indext * CAPt-1    3.362 *** 1.1490    0.595 *** 0.0407 
MP_ Resilience indext * SIZEt-1    0.090 * 0.0525    0.005  0.0068 
MP_ Resilience indext * LIQt-1    0.120  0.2813    0.141  0.0954 
MP_ Resilience indext * DEPt-1    2.267 *** 0.8440    0.380 *** 0.0549 
Country*Time dummies yes yes yes yes 
Sample period 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 
Observations 20,870 20,870 20,870 20,870 
Serial correlation test1 0.077 0.094 0.194 0.0754 
Hansen test2 0.138 0.229 0.123 0.329 
Notes: The database is composed of 3,177 banks headquartered in 61 countries. Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank-year level) are 
reported. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The coefficient for the banking crisis dummy 
is not reported. 1 Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second order serial 





Table C10: Baseline regression with aggregate macroprudential index (controlling for regulatory strength) 
             
 Dependent variable: Annual change of the expected 
default frequency over a 1 year horizon  
Dependent variable: Annual 
 change of the Z-score 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err 
Dependent variablet-1 0.238 *** 0.006 0.244 *** 0.005 0.894 *** 0.028 0.912 *** 0.018 
∆EDF_NFSt 0.445 *** 0.073 0.491 *** 0.125 0.015 *** 0.003 0.020 *** 0.002 
DIFFt -0.022 ** 0.009 -0.020 ** 0.009 -0.007 ** 0.003 -0.010 ** 0.004 
∆GDPt -0.355  0.858 -1.374  0.928 -0.696 *** 0.039 -0.655 *** 0.039 
SIZEt-1 -0.019 *** 0.005 -0.039 ** 0.019 -0.019 ** 0.009 -0.012 ** 0.005 
LIQt-1 -0.123 *** 0.016 -0.129 ** 0.059 -0.035  0.042 -0.060 * 0.032 
CAPt-1 -0.420 *** 0.139 -0.572 *** 0.218 -0.765 *** 0.024 -0.401 *** 0.014 
DEPt-1 -0.224 ** 0.092 -0.277 ** 0.127 -0.873 *** 0.199 -0.545 *** 0.069 
MP_indext -0.659 *** 0.062 -0.810 *** 0.245 -0.015 *** 0.003 -0.022 *** 0.005 
MP_indext*CAP t-1    1.246 *** 0.060    0.169 *** 0.003 
MP_indext*SIZE t-1    0.157 *** 0.031    0.008 ** 0.004 
MP_indext*LIQ t-1    0.332 * 0.178    0.218 * 0.112 
MP_indext*DEP t-1    0.247 * 0.127    0.118 *** 0.015 
Banking crisis index 0.283 ** 0.1108 0.224 * 0.1241 0.294 ** 0.120 0.291 ** 0.146 
Regulat. strength index -2.804 *** 0.3459 -1.641 *** 0.2360 -0.574 *** 0.180 -0.173 * 0.099 
Sample period 1999-2012 1999-2012 1999-2012 1999-2012 
Observations 16,615 16,615 16,615 16,615 
Serial correlation test1 0.109 0.116 0.112 0.136 
Hansen test2 0.426 0.443 0.164 0.118 
Notes: The database is composed of 3,177 banks headquartered in 61 countries. Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank-year level) 
are reported. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 1 Reports p-values for the null 
hypothesis that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second order serial correlation. 2 Reports p-values for the null 





Table C11: Cyclical vs Resilience macroprudential tools (controlling for regulatory strength) 
       
 Dependent variable: Annual 
change of the expected default 
frequency over a 1 year horizon  
Dependent variable: Annual 
change of the Z-score 
 (I) (II) 
 Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err 
Dependent variablet-1 0.089 ** 0.043 0.890 *** 0.067 
∆EDF_NFSt 0.614 *** 0.090 0.032 *** 0.005 
DIFFt -0.041 ** 0.019 -0.018 *** 0.004 
∆GDPt -1.517  2.442 -0.768 *** 0.261 
SIZEt-1 -0.053 * 0.027 -0.012 ** 0.005 
LIQt-1 -0.278 *** 0.015 -0.158 *** 0.060 
CAPt-1 -1.711 *** 0.507 -0.425 *** 0.112 
DEPt-1 -1.299 *** 0.192 -0.547 *** 0.100 
MP_Cyclical indext -0.473 ** 0.194 -0.037 * 0.020 
MP_Resilience_indext -0.158 *** 0.042 -0.066 *** 0.001 
MP_Cyclical indext * CAPt-1 1.510 *** 0.434 0.568 *** 0.145 
MP_Cyclical indext * SIZEt-1 0.125 * 0.067 0.009 * 0.005 
MP_Cyclical indext * LIQt-1 0.551 *** 0.010 0.162 *** 0.040 
MP_Cyclical indext * DEPt-1 0.545 ** 0.237 0.117 * 0.069 
MP_ Resilience indext * CAPt-1 2.056 ** 0.913 0.621 *** 0.183 
MP_ Resilience indext * SIZEt-1 0.088 ** 0.035 0.031 *** 0.006 
MP_ Resilience indext * LIQt-1 0.304 * 0.158 0.104 * 0.058 
MP_ Resilience indext * DEPt-1 1.501 ** 0.737 0.101 *** 0.020 
Banking crisis index 0.089 ** 0.043 0.890 *** 0.067 
Regulatory strength index 0.614 *** 0.090 0.032 *** 0.005 
Sample period 1999-2012 1999-2012 
Observations 16,615 16,615 
Serial correlation test1 0.152 0.274 
Hansen test2 0.738 0.741 
Notes: The database is composed of 3,177 banks headquartered in 61 countries. Robust standard errors (clustered at 
the bank year level) are reported. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
1Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second order serial 
correlation. 2 Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. 





Table C12: Using only Z-score as dependent variable to enlarge the sample 
       
 Baseline regression with 
aggregate macroprudential index 
Cyclical vs Resilience 
macroprudential tools 
Dependent variable: Annual change of the 
Z-score 
(I) (II) 
 Coeff  Std err Coeff  Std err 
Dependent variablet-1 0.921 *** 0.0140 0.901 *** 0.0359 
∆EDF_NFSt 0.017 *** 0.0059 0.023 *** 0.0004 
DIFFt -0.004 ** 0.0015 -0.006 *** 0.0019 
∆GDPt -0.228 *** 0.0254 -0.645 *** 0.0254 
SIZEt-1 -0.004 *** 0.0012 -0.010 * 0.0053 
LIQt-1 -0.121 ** 0.0581 -0.119 * 0.0659 
CAPt-1 -0.533 *** 0.1480 -1.106 *** 0.0825 
DEPt-1 -0.871 ** 0.4276 -1.408 *** 0.1500 
MP_indext -0.019 *** 0.0064    
MP_indext*CAP t-1 0.013 *** 0.0037    
MP_indext*SIZE t-1 0.008 ** 0.0041    
MP_indext*LIQ t-1 0.127  0.0828    
MP_indext*DEP t-1 0.112 *** 0.0221    
MP_Cyclical indext    -0.046 ** 0.0212 
MP_Resilience_indext    -0.024 *** 0.0052 
MP_Cyclical indext * CAPt-1    0.385 *** 0.0376 
MP_Cyclical indext * SIZEt-1    0.005 ** 0.0024 
MP_Cyclical indext * LIQt-1    0.017  0.0275 
MP_Cyclical indext * DEPt-1    0.010  0.0070 
MP_ Resilience indext * CAPt-1    0.136 *** 0.0183 
MP_ Resilience indext * SIZEt-1    0.011 *** 0.0022 
MP_ Resilience indext * LIQt-1    0.293 ** 0.1430 
MP_ Resilience indext * DEPt-1      0.212 ** 0.1068 
Sample period 1990-2012 1990-2012 
Observations 115,611 115,611 
Serial correlation test1 0.115 0.104 
Hansen test2 0.133 0.129 
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank year level) are reported. The symbols *, **, and *** represent 
significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The coefficient for the banking crisis dummy is not reported. 1Reports 
p-values for the null hypothesis that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second order serial 
correlation. 2 Reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. 
       
 
 
 
